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Over the past few years, nearly two hundred university and college
campuses have experienced racial unrest serious or graphic enough to be
reported in the press.1 Most observers believe the increase in racial ten-
sion on the nation's campuses is real, and not just the product of better
reporting or record keeping.
2
* Charles Inglis Thomson Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law. J.D. 1974,
U-C Berkeley School of Law (Boalt Hall). I delivered portions of this paper in talks at Harvard
University and the University of Wisconsin in winter 1989-90. I am grateful to Kent Greenawalt,
Michael Olivas, and Pierre Schlag for comments and suggestions. Anne Najem, Michael Kramer,
Joan Leon, Marisa Walsh, and Bruce Bode, members of my fall 1989 first amendment seminar at
University of Wisconsin, drafted major sections of this Article, and Lora Intrator and Robin Barnes
performed heroically in editing and criticizing a sprawling manuscript. I am also indebted to
Charles Holley, Markie Rath, Tim O'Shea, Elizabeth Griffin, Titus Peterson, and Frank Rodriguez
for exemplary assistance in researching difficult sources and issues. This Article is the joint produc-
tion of all those listed in this note.
I Campbell, Silencing Bigots, Texas Observer, Jan. 26, 1990, at 14; Magner, Blacks and Whites
on Campus, Chron. Higher Educ., Apr. 26, 1989, at 1, col. 2 ("Hundreds of institutions of all sizes
have been affected," citing 175 since 1986-87 year); see also Leatherman, More Anti-Semitism is
Being Reported on Campuses, but Educators Disagree on How to Respond to It, Chron. Higher Educ.,
Feb. 7, 1990, at 1, col. 3; Colleges Tackle Increase in Racism on Campus, L.A. Times, Apr. 30, 1989,
Pt. I, at 36, col. 1 (National Institute Against Prejudice & Violence estimates 20-25% of all minority
students victimized at least once).
2 Eg., Brown, Racism and Race Relations in the University, 76 VA. L. REv. 295, 316 (1990)
(under-reporting likely); Gibbs, Bigots in the Ivory Tower, An Alarming Rise in Hatred Roils U.S.
Campuses, TIME, May 7, 1990, at 104; Lawrence, The Debate Over Placing Limits on Racist Speech
Must Not Ignore the Damage It Does To Its Victims, Chron. Higher Educ., Oct. 25, 1989, at BI, col.
1 (rate increasing); Tate, Clear, Narrow Policies on Offensive Speech May Not Run Afoul of the First
Amendment, Chron. Higher Educ., Feb. 7, 1990, at B1 (rate increasing); see also When Is a Joke Not
a Joke? Shouts and Swastikas are Getting the Last Laugh, NEWSWEEK, May 23, 1988, at 79 (same);
Leatherman, supra note I (anti-semitism increasing); Chung, Racial Hate Victims Talk to State
Panel, San Francisco Chron., Oct. 7, 1989, at C1l, col. 4 (hate crimes, harassment against Asians
increasing in California schools). But see Leo, Racism on American College Campuses, U.S. NEWS
& WORLD RPs., Jan. 8, 1990, at 53 (reports exaggerated, "massively unconvincing," and "over-
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In response, a number of campuses have enacted student conduct
rules prohibiting slurs and disparaging remarks directed against persons
on account of their ethnicity, religion, or sexual orientation.3 The Uni-
versity of Wisconsin rule, for example, prohibits remarks that (i) are di-
rected to an individual; (ii) demean based on membership in a racial,
religious, or sexual group; (iii) are intended to demean; and (iv) interfere
with the victim's ability to take part in education or instruction.4
This Article deals with some of the thorny issues such rules raise.
Part I discusses how we characterize the problem. As will be seen, it
may be framed in two ways-as a first or fourteenth amendment prob-
lem-that are equally valid but lead to drastically different consequences.
Yet, no a priori reason exists for declaring the problem "essentially" one
of free speech or protection of equality. 5 Part II surveys the extent of
campus racism and various universities' responses to it. Since our society
has had relatively little experience with regulating group-disparaging
speech, Part III reviews efforts of other Western nations in dealing with
it. Part IV examines the teachings of social science on racism and its
control. Part V applies case law and theories of free speech and equal
protection to the problem of campus racism.
These "subnarratives" highlight the inadequacy of conventional
blown"); Bernstein, On Campus, How Free Should Speech Be?, N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 1989, at E5,
col. 1 ("a handful of bigots").
For a further discussion of the harms of racist speech, see infra notes 247-73 and accompanying
text. For a discussion of the effects on black college students of racial tension and harassment, see
Fleming, Stress and Satisfaction in College Years of Black Students, J. NEGRO EDUc. 307 (1985).
For a discussion of the resurgence of racism and antisemitism in Europe, see Racism Revived, THE
ECONOMIST, May 19, 1990, at 14; see also Sherman, Hate Crime Statutes Abound, NAT'L L.J., May
21, 1990, at 3, col. 1 (U.S. states enacting anti-hate laws to deal with resurging racism).
3 See infra notes 27-120 and accompanying text, discussing rules. Antiracism rules are not the
only response a university might make to resurgent racism. Other possibilities include: (i) doing
nothing; (ii) using existing codes to punish racist conduct; (iii) using teaching or moral exhortation
in hopes of persuading would-be racists to moderate their behavior; (iv) instituting civil or criminal
action under state law. Id. (discussing various approaches taken at different campuses).
4 UNiv. Wis. STAT. § 17.06(2)(a), discussed infra at notes 91-120 and accompanying text. The
rule reads as follows:
UWS 17.06 OFFENSES DEFINED. The university may discipline a student in nonacademic
matters in the following situations.
(2)(a) For racist or discriminatory comments, epithets or other expressive behavior directed
at an individual or on separate occasions at different individuals, or for physical conduct, if such
comments, epithets, other expressive behavior or physical conduct intentionally:
1. Demean the race, sex, religion, color, creed, disability, sexual orientation, national origin,
ancestry or age of the individual or individuals; and
2. Create an intimidating, hostile or demeaning environment for education, university re-
lated work, or other university-authorized activity.
(b) Whether the intent required under par. (a) is present shall be determined by consider-
ation of all relevant circumstances.
A more restrictive rule at the University of Michigan was recently declared unconstitutional on
vagueness grounds. See infra notes 78-90 and accompanying text.
5 On essentialism, see generally Harris, Race and Essentialism in American Feminist Legal The-
ory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 201 (1990).
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analysis in dealing with issues, like campus antiracism rules, that straddle
fault lines in our system of values. Even together, Parts III, IV, and V
barely begin to close the gap between liberty and equality that campus
antiracism rules open. Yet our dilemma may yield to a postmodern in-
sight discussed in Part VI: regulation of the speech by which a dominant
group "constructs" a stigma-picture of a subordinate group may be car-
ried out without offending core values of the first amendment, and may
be necessary for full effectuation of the fourteenth.
I. FRAMING THE ISSUE
Persons tend to react to the problem of racial insults in one of two
ways. On hearing that a university has enacted rules forbidding certain
forms of speech, some will frame the issue as a first amendment problem:
the rules limit speech, and the Constitution forbids official regulation of
speech without a very good reason. 6 If one takes that starting point, sev-
eral consequences follow. First, the burden shifts to the other side to
show that the interest in protecting members of the campus community
from insults and name-calling is compelling enough to overcome the pre-
sumption in favor of free speech.7 Further, there must be no less onerous
way of accomplishing that objective.8 Moreover, some will worry
whether the enforcer of the regulation will become a censor, imposing
narrow-minded restraints on campus discussion. 9 Some will also be con-
cerned about slippery slopes and line-drawing problems: if a campus re-
stricts this type of expression, might the temptation arise to do the same
with classroom speech or political satire in the campus newspaper?10
6 U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech");
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (applying free.speech guaranty to the states); see
Hentoff, Voodoo Constitutional Law, Village Voice, Aug. 29, 1989, at 20, col. I (campus antiracism
rules "mug" the first amendment, a step toward recreating spirit of Nazism and the Third Reich).
For a more moderate view, see Lawrence, supra note 2 (advocating a narrow first amendment
"exception").
7 Eg., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co.,
304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938). The free-speech aspect of campus antiracism rules is discussed
infra notes 276-319 and accompanying text.
8 In other words, there must be no way of protecting minorities that encroaches less on freedom
of speech. Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 425 U.S. 130 (1974); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S.
601, 611 (1973); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963) (state action limiting speech must be
narrowly tailored to accomplish objective).
9 See Z. CHAiEE, FaE SPEECH IN THE UNrrED STATES 223-25 (1941) (fear of official censor-
ship a central concern of framers); see also Shunny, BROwN ALuMNI MONTHLY, Nov. 1989, at 6
(punishing racists can backfire-it just encourages them and makes them martyrs) (letter to editor);
Campbell, supra note I (ACLU expresses this concern over campus antiracism rules); Will, Aca-
demic Liberal's Brand of Censorhip, San Francisco Chron., Nov. 7, 1989, at A22, col. 5.
10 Eg., Will, In Praise of Censure, TIME, July 31, 1989, at 71-72; Campbell, supra note 1, at 15;
O'Neil, Colleges Should Seek Educational Alternatives to Rules That Override the Historic Guaran-
tees of Free Speech, Chron. Higher Educ., Oct. 18, 1989, at BI, col. 1 ("the exception we make today
... may return to haunt us"); Taylor, "Fighting Words" Laws Should Focus on Intent, Not Control,
The Recorder, Jan. 3, 1990, at 6, col. 1.
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Others, however, will frame the problem as one of protection of
equality. They will ask whether an educational institution does not have
the power, to protect core values emanating from the thirteenth and
fourteenth amendments,11 to enact reasonable regulations aimed at as-
suring equal personhood on campus. 12 If one characterizes the issue this
way, other consequences follow. Now, the defenders of racially scathing
speech are required to show that the interest in its protection is compel-
ling enough to overcome the preference for equal personhood; 13 and we
will want to be sure that this interest is advanced in the way least damag-
ing to equality. 14 There are again concerns about the decisionmaker who
will enforce the rules, but from the opposite standpoint: the enforcer of
the regulation must be attuned to the nuances of insult and racial
supremacy at issue, for example by incorporating multi-ethnic represen-
tation into the hearing process. 15 Finally, a different set of slopes will
look slippery. If we do not intervene to protect equality here, what will
the next outrage be?
The legal analysis, therefore, leads to opposite conclusions depend-
ing on the starting point. But there is an even deeper indeterminacy:
both sides invoke different narratives to rally support.16 Protectors of the
first amendment see campus antiracism rules as parts of a much longer
story: the centuries-old struggle of Western society to free itself from
11 U.S. CONST. amends. XIII & XIV (prohibiting slavery, and requiring equal protection of the
laws); see also U.S. CoNsT. amend. XV (requiring equal access to the vote).
12 This concern underlay enactment of the Wisconsin rule. See Statement of Regent Erroll B.
Davis, Jr., Diversity Conference, UW-Madison, Nov. 17, 1989, at 2 (on file with author).
13 See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (equality high value in our constitutional
system); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (upholding Congress's power to enact
rules protecting this value); see also infra notes 320-35 and accompanying text (place of equality in
American legal system).
14 Eg., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307-10 (1978) (Powell, J.).
15 At Madison, for example, broad participation was sought in drafting UNIv. Wis. STAT.
§ 17.06; its enforcement was assigned to the office of the Dean of Students, which is ethnically
integrated.
16 Recent scholarship has emphasized the manner in which our understanding of reality is medi-
ated by narratives or stories-interpretive structures that enable us to place events together and
infuse them with meaning and coherence. See P. RICOEUR, TIME AND NARRATIvE (1984); ON
NARRATIVE (W. Mitchell ed. 1980); Delgado, Legal Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A
Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411 (1989); see also P. BERGER & T. LUCKMAN, THE SOCIAL
CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY (1967); N. GOODMAN, WAYS OF WORLDMAKING (1978). Legal sto-
ries are no exception to this rule, see J. WHITE, HERACLES' BOW: ESSAYS ON THE POETICS AND
RHETORIC OF LAW 175 (1985) ("the narrative is the archetypal legal and rhetorical form, as it is the
archetypal form of human thought in ordinary life"); Delgado, supra; Minow, The Supreme Court,
1986 Term-Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REv. 10 (1987). The general term often
applied to such approaches is "postmodernism." See generally L. HUTCHEON, A POETICS OF
POSTMODERNISM: HISTORY, THEORY, FICTION (1988); Lyotard, Answering the Question: What is
Postmodernism?, in THE POSTMODERN CONDITION: A REPORT ON KNOWLEDGE 71 (G. Benning-
ton & B. Massurni trans. 1984); Schlag, Missing Pieces" A Cognitive Approach to Law, 67 TEx. L.
REv. 1195, 1213-20 (1989). For the view that stories may mediate for ill (Le., may promote discord,
rather than harmony), see Delgado, Mindset and Metaphor, 103 HARv. L. REv. 1872 (1990).
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superstition and enforced ignorance. The tellers of this story invoke mar-
tyrs like Socrates, Galileo, and Peter Zenger, and heroes like Locke,
Hobbes, Voltaire, and Hume who fought for the right of free expres-
sion. 17 They conjure up struggles against official censorship, book burn-
ing, witch trials, and communist blacklists. 18 Compared to that richly
textured, deeply stirring account, the minority-protector's interest in
freeing a few (supersensitive?) individuals from momentary discomfort
looks thin. 19 A textured, historical account is pitted against a particular-
ized, slice-of-life, dignitary one.
Those on the minority-protection side invoke a different, and no less
powerful, narrative. They see a nation's centuries-long struggle to free
itself from racial and other forms of tyranny, including slavery, lynching,
Jim Crow laws, and "separate-but-equal" schools. 20 They conjure up dif-
ferent milestones-Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation, Brown v.
Board of Education; they look to different heroes-Martin Luther King,
the early Abolitionists, Rosa Parks, and Cesar Chavez, civil rights
protesters who put their lives on the line for racial justice.21 Arrayed
against that richly textured historical account, the racist's interest in in-
suiting a person of color face-to-face looks thin.
One often hears that the problem of campus antiracism rules is that
of balancing free speech and equality.22 But more is at stake. Each side
wants not merely to have the balance struck in its favor; each wants to
impose its own understanding of what is at stake. Minority protectors
see the injury of one who has been subject to a racial assault as not a
mere isolated event, but as part of an interrelated series of acts, by which
persons of color are subordinated, and which will follow the victim wher-
17 See Z. CHAFEE, supra note 9, at 497-501; Delgado & Millen, God, Galileo and Government:
Toward Constitutional Protection for Scientific Inquiry, 53 WASH. L. REv. 349 (1978).
18 Z. CHAFEE, supra note 9; LIBERTY OF THE PRESS FROM ZENGER TO JEFFERSON (L. Levy ed.
1966). For an example of such a struggle, see Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
19 But see Davis, Law as Micro-Aggression, 98 YALE L.J. 1559 (1989) (people of color are the
victims of frequent "micro-aggressions," and expend much energy deciding which to confront and
which to let pass).
20 For accounts of this struggle, see, ag., D. BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED (1987); V. HAR-
DING, THERE IS A RIVER (1981). It is worth observing that few black people wrote the first amend-
ment narrative; the first amendment co-existed with slavery. By the same token, few first
amendment absolutists have taken central roles in the struggle for black justice. Indeed, blacks have
made their greatest gains when they acted in defiance of constitutional rules and understandings of
the limits of free speech and assembly. Lawrence, When Racism Dresses in Speech's Clothing: Rec-
onciling the First and Fourteenth Amendments (unpublished address at ACLU biennial meeting,
Madison Wis. June 15, 1989, on file with author); see infra notes 336-53 and accompanying text
(attempting to reconcile the two narratives).
21 Eg., D. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 2-53 (Ch. 1: American Racism and the
Uses of History) (2d ed. 1980); see Edelman, Punishing Perpetrators of Racist Speech, Legal Times,
May 15, 1989, at 20 (accusing higher education leaders of hiding behind the first amendment).
22 O'Neil, supra note 10 (balancing, but concluding that first amendment values preponderate);
Edelman, supra note 21 (coming to opposite conclusion).
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ever she goes.23 First amendment defenders see the wrong of silencing
the racist as much more than a momentary inconvenience: protection of
his right to speak is part of the never-ending vigilance necessary to pre-
serve freedom of expression in a society that is too prone to balance it
away.2
4
My view is that both stories are equally valid. Judges and university
administrators have no easy, a priori way of choosing between them, of
privileging one over the other. They could coin an exception to free
speech, thus giving primacy to the equal protection values at stake.25 Or,
they could carve an exception to equality, saying in effect that universi-
ties may protect minority populations except where this abridges speech.
Nothing in constitutional or moral theory requires one answer rather
than the other. Social science, case law, and the experience of other na-
tions provide some illumination. But ultimately, judges and university
administrators must choose. And in making this choice, we are in un-
charted terrain: we lack a pole star. To gain a sense of the scope of the
problem, the next Part reviews recent events at leading universities and
reactions to those events.
II. THE CURRENT CONTROVERSY
Incidents of racism and other forms of bigotry have been proliferat-
ing on the nation's campuses. 26 Some universities have done as little as
23 See Davis, supra note 19; Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults,
Epithets and Name-Calling, 17 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133 (1982).
24 See Hentoff, supra note 6, at 20.
25 For exposition of this view, see Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the
Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2356-80 (1989).
26 This upsurge has been paralleled by a similar increase in the society at large. See Van Tassel,
Colleges Fighting Growth in Prejudice, N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 1988, § 12NJ, at 4, col. 5 (incidents of
racial prejudice increasing throughout country).
A sampling of campuses where such events have taken place includes: University of Connecti-
cut (Asian students spat on and subject to racial slurs while riding to student dance, Hamilton, U.
Conn. Panel Is to Study Racial Abuse, N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 1988, § 12CN, at 1, col. 5); University
of Pennsylvania (fraternity sponsored rush party featuring black strippers who performed while au-
dience shouted epithets, Penn Fraternities Suspended, N.Y. Times, Mar. 5, 1988, § I, at 7, col. 1);
Brown University (racial and homophobic graffiti and flyers, Berger, Deep Divisions Persist in New
Generation at College, N.Y. Times, May 22, 1989, at Al, col. I); University of Mississippi (arson
destroyed all-black fraternity house, Fraternity Row Integrated at Ole Miss, N.Y. Times, Oct. 16,
1988, § 1, at 20, col. 1); Temple University (students formed a White Student Union, Wilson, New
White Student Unions on Some Campuses are Sparking Outrage and Worry, Chron. Higher Educ.,
Apr. 18, 1990, at 1, col. 2); Farleigh Dickenson University (racial brawls and fighting, Van Tassel,
supra); Southern Connecticut (same, Panel Seeks Penalties For Campus Racism, N.Y. Times, June
25, 1989, § 12CN, at 10, col. 5); Rutgers University (vandalism, Van Tassel, supra; see Chron.
Higher Educ., Sept. 6, 1989, at A2, col. 3); Yale (same, Hentoff, Free Speech on the Campus, 53 THE
PROGRESSIVE 12 (May 1989)); Smith College (same, Van Tassel, supra); University of Michigan
(slurs and caricatures, Lord, The Greek Rites of Exclusion, 245 NATION 10-12 (1987)); Hastings
College (same, Shapiro, Racist Caricatures Anger Students, The Recorder, Feb. 10, 1989, § 1, at 1,
col. 2); Arizona State University (same, Berger, Deep Racial Divisions Persist in New Generation at
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possible or have focused on specific episodes or perpetrators. Others
have instituted broad-based reforms, ranging from curricular changes to
adoption of student conduct rules penalizing racist speech and acts. Sub-
part A discusses events at eight selected campuses. Subpart B summa-
rizes some of the commentary over campus efforts to punish racist
speech.
A. Major Incidents and Institutional Responses
1. The Citadel.-In October 1986, a black cadet was asleep in his
room when he was awakened by five intruders chanting his name. The
invaders, clad in white sheets and cone-shaped pillowcase masks, shouted
obscenities and fled, leaving behind a charred cross made of newspaper.27
Five white cadets confessed. 28 The Citadel's president condemned the
action but denied it reflected the racial climate on campus.29 Shortly
thereafter, the black cadet resigned from the academy because of harass-
ment for having reported the incident,30 and filed an $800,000 civil rights
action against the school.31 College officials then issued a report absolv-
ing the school of responsibility and recommending only increased ethnic
awareness classes for cadets.32 One year later, a local grand jury indicted
the five cadets on charges of illegally wearing masks in violation of a state
anti-Klan law.33 The Citadel promulgated no new rule governing racial
insult or hazing.
2. Dartmouth College.-In February 1988, four members of The
Dartmouth Review, a conservative weekly newspaper, confronted Wil-
liam S. Cole, a Black professor, at the conclusion of his music history
College, N.Y. Times, May 22, 1989, at Al, col. 1); Wisconsin (same, see infra notes 91-120 and
accompanying text); Hamilton College (same, Carmody, College Erred in Suspensions, A Court
Rules, N.Y. Times, Aug. 2, 1987, § 1, at 49, col. 1); and Oberlin College (same, Edelman, supra note
21, at 20).
27 Clendinen, Citadel's Cadets Feeling Effects of a Klan-Like Act, N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1986,
§ 1, at 26, col. 1.
28 Rights Group Files Suit in Citadel Hazing Case, N.Y. Times, Dec. 19, 1986, at A22, col. 1.
29 Five Citadel Cadets Confined to Campus for Hazing Black, N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1986, § 1, at
14, col. 1.
30 At the time of his resignation, the black student, Kevin Nesmith stated, "I feel that I have
been made the villain when the villains are at the Citadel." Black at Citadel Leaves Over Harrass-
ment, N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1986, § 1, at 6, col. 6. Four hundred demonstrators marched through
the streets of Charleston in protest of Nesmith's treatment. Id.
31 Rights Group Files Suit in Citadel Hazing Case, N.Y. Times, Dec. 19, 1986, at A22, col. 1.
The complaint alleged that school officials had tolerated and perpetuated racial bigotry by failing to
expel the five cadets. Id. On February 4, 1987, one of the five cadets filed court papers seeking
damages on the grounds that Nesmith incurred no injury from the "hazing" and was therefore filing
an improper suit. White at Citadel Says Hazing was Harmless, N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1987, at A22,
col. 1.
32 Inquiry at Citadel Says Record on Race is Good, N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1987, at A20, col. 6.
33 N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1987, at A20, col. 1.
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class.34 The newspaper had recently published a highly critical review of
Cole's course.35 The confrontation turned into a shouting and pushing
match between the professor and Review members. Black students
charged that the article and classroom incident were racially motivated;
36
the Review insisted that they were simply fair criticism of a professor's
teaching ability.37 A university panel found three staff members guilty of
disorderly conduct, harassment, and invasion of privacy for initiating
and secretly recording the "vexatious exchange" with Cole.38 The event
caused a heated exchange between the Review and Dartmouth President
James 0. Freedman, who criticized the newspaper for "poisoning... the
intellectual environment. ' 39 For its part, the Review charged Freedman
with censorship and reverse discrimination.40
Racial tensions continued to mount.41 In two later issues, the Re-
view compared President Freedman, a Jew, with Adolph Hitler.42 The
college trustees condemned the newspaper, but declared themselves pow-
erless to impose punishment.43 Shortly thereafter, a superior court judge
ordered Dartmouth to reinstate two of the students on the ground that a
member of the disciplinary panel had been biased against them.44 Two
months later, a federal district judge dismissed the students' suit against
the university.45 Like the Citadel, Darmouth took no action to prohibit
racial insult and invective.
34 Gold, Racial Tension at Dartmouth As Teacher and Paper Clash, N.Y. Times, Mar. 2, 1988, at
A16, col. 5.
35 The Review described Professor Cole's course on American Music in Oral Tradition as "one
of Dartmouth's most academically deficient courses." Gold, Dartmouth Punishes Four as Harassers
of Professors, N.Y. Times, Mar. 11, 1988, at A15, col.1.
36 Casey, At Dartmouth: The Clash of'89, N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1989, § 6 (Magazine) at 28, col.
2.
37 Gold, Dartmouth Ends Week of Rallies in Effort to Curb Campus Racism, N.Y. Times, Mar.
5, 1988, § 1, at 7, col. 1.
38 Gold, supra note 35.
39 Gold, Dartmouth President Faults Right-Wing Student Journal, N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 1988, at
A16, col. 4.
40 Id.; see also Binder & May, Washington Talk: Briefing: Just Like the 60's!, N.Y. Times, July
27, 1988, at A18, col. 5. The plaintiffs charged that the penalties imposed by the school would have
been less severe if the case had involved an exchange between black students and a white professor.
Id.
41 Harassing Letters Upset Students at Dartmouth, N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1988, at B9, col. 5.
Black, gay and female Dartmouth students received unsigned letters demanding that they leave the
school. Id. Complaints of racist and sexist graffiti and of obscene and racist phone messages in-
creased. Id.
42 The editor denied any antisemitic intent. Gold, Satire by Dartmouth Publication Under Heavy
Fire as Anti-Semitic, N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1988, § 1, at 22, col. 5. In one issue, a headline played on a
Nazi slogan and referred to President Freedman as "Fuhrer." Id. Another article, on the presi-
dent's alleged anticonservative stance, made references to the Holocaust's "final solution" to the
conservative problem and to conservatives being "deported in cattle cars in the night." Id.
43 Trustees Voice "Shock" on Dartmouth Review, N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1988, at Bl 1, col. 1.
44 Dartmouth is Ordered to Reinstate 2 Editors, N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1989, at A16, col. 6.
45 Federal Judge Dismissed Suit by 3 Students at Dartmouth, N.Y. Times, Mar. 23, 1989, at A17,
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3. Columbia University.-In March 1987, Michael Jones, a black
senior, had an altercation with Matthew Sodl, a white football player and
fraternity member, at a campus discotheque.46 Later, Jones and five
black friends brawled with Sodl and a group of his friends outside the
discotheque.47 Each side claimed provocation4 8 and charged the other
with using racist language.49 When the university responded slowly, sev-
eral protests followed, including one in which black demonstrators and
their supporters occupied the administration building.50 The demonstra-
tion ended only after New York police arrested fifty demonstrators.
Soon after, the university released a report which described the brawl as
racial and charged one white male student with "verbal abuse." 51 The
report noted that several black students refused to cooperate with the
investigation, which prevented the university from proceeding against
additional individuals, 52 an assertion many students refused to accept.53
Their indignation increased when criminal charges were dropped, 54 a
university disciplinary panel issued only warnings,55 and a federal jury
found that Columbia discriminated against the only student disciplined
for the fight, because he was white.56 At the time this Article was writ-
col. 6; see Dartmouth Review v. Dartmouth College, 889 F.2d 13 (1st Cir. 1989), aff'g 709 F. Supp.
32 (D.N.H. 1989).
46 Jones reportedly spilled beer on Sodl; Sodl reportedly responded by rubbing Jones's head and
making a sarcastic remark about his hair. Blacks at Columbia U. File Charges in Brawl, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 24, 1987, at B5, col. 5. Jones had a run-in with Sodl and his fraternity friends two weeks before
this incident. Columbia to Investigate a Reported Racial Brawl, N.Y. Times, Mar. 23, 1987, at B2,
col. 1.
47 Columbia to Investigate A Reported Racial Brawl, N.Y. Times, Mar. 23, 1987, at B2, col. 1.
48 Id.
49 Blacks at Columbia U File Charges in Brawl, N.Y. Times, Mar. 24, 1987, at B5, col. 5.
50 Morgan, 50 Arrested in Anti-Racism Protest at Columbia, N.Y. Times, Apr. 22, 1987, at B3,
col. 1. The first protest included approximately 150 demonstrators. A new group, called Concerned
Black Students of Columbia (CBSC), criticized the failure of the police and university to act quickly.
Blacks at Columbia U File Charges in Brawl, N.Y. Times, Mar. 24, 1987, at B5 col. 5. The group
and others staged a protest at police headquarters in Manhattan, where police responded by saying
that it was the black complainants' own refusal to cooperate that was hampering the investigation.
The complainants' attorney countered by accusing the police of acting in bad faith. 23 Seized in
Protest on Columbia Clash, N.Y. Times, Apr. 8, 1987, at B5, col. 1.
51 Carmody, Columbia Report Cites Racial Unrest, N.Y. Times, Apr. 23, 1987, at B2, col. 3
(reporting that an unidentified black man threw the first blow).
52 Id.
53 Id. The attorney for the CBSC viewed the report as "an attempt to blame the victims... for
the fact that the university has not been able to do a proper investigation." Id. Other students
described the school's disciplinary process as "a joke." Id.
54 Neuffer, Columbia Begins Disciplinary Hearings on Protest, N.Y. Times, May 27, 1987, at B3,
col. 3.
55 Uhlig, Columbia Panel Rejects Expelling Any Students in Protest on Racism, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 5, 1987, at B2, col. 1. The warnings could be expunged from the students' records after one
term of violation-free conduct. Id.
56 White Columbia Student is Ruled Bias Victim, N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1988, at B1, col. 4.
Krause had been suspended for one term but had received a stay. The jury awarded $I in damages.
Id.
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ten, Columbia had enacted no new student rule forbidding racial behav-
ior or insult.
4. University of California-Berkeley.-An intoxicated fraternity
member shouted obscenities and racial slurs at a group of black students
as they passed by his fraternity house;57 later, a campus radio disc jockey
told black students to "go back to Oakland" when they asked the station
to play rap music. 58 Members of a gay and lesbian group reported that
an anonymous caller had left a message on its telephone recorder declar-
ing, "You should be taken out and gassed, like Hitler did with the
Jews."' 59 Berkeley responded to these and other events by instituting a
campus-wide Diversity Awareness program,6° and the statewide system
enacted a policy prohibiting "those personally abusive epithets which,
when directly addressed to any ordinary person, are likely to provoke a
violent reaction whether or not they actually do so. ''61 The rule applies
to words spoken on university property, at official university functions
and events. Penalties range from reprimands to dismissal.62
5. Stanford University.-In fall 1988, a group of black and white
students at Stanford debated the racial ancestry of composer Ludwig von
Beethoven.63 The black students correctly maintained that he was a mu-
latto; some of the white students denied it. Later, two of the white stu-
dents defaced a poster of Beethoven by scribbling on the face and adding
stereotypically black facial features.64 The incident sparked a sharp con-
frontation between black and white students.65 Later, Stanford released
57 Curtis, College Campuses Reinforce Rules Barring Racism, San Francisco Chron., Sept. 18,
1989, at Al, col. 1.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id. In the program, students discuss cultures and backgrounds in an effort to break down
stereotypes. Id.
61 Curtis, Racial, Ethnic, Sexual Slurs Banned on UC Campuses, San Francisco Chron., Sept.
27, 1989, at Al, col. 3. Such words include terms widely regarded as disparaging of a person's "race,
ethnicity, religion, sex, sexual orientation, disability and other personal characteristics." Id.
62 Id.; see Shapiro, UC's Doctrine of Silence, The Recorder, Oct. 2, 1989, at 1, col. 2 (Laurence
Tribe offered the opinion that the UC rule is constitutional on its face, but could be misapplied.).
63 Workman, Legal Opinion in Stanford Poster Case, San Francisco Chron., Feb. 9, 1989, at A2,
col. 5.
64 Barringer, Campus Battle Pits Freedom of Speech Against Racial Slurs, N.Y. Times, Apr. 25,
1989, § 1, at 1, col. 1. They then placed the poster outside a black student's dormitory room. Id.
65 Workman, supra note 63, at A2, col. 6. Stanford legal counsel recommended against disci-
plining the perpetrators because the poster was a form of expression. Id. The opinion stated that the
first amendment would also protect the December 1988 distribution of recruiting leaflets at Stanford
Law School on behalf of the White Aryan Resistance, Shapiro, Racist Caricatures Anger Students,
The Recorder, Feb. 10, 1989, at 1, col. 2, an action that angered many black students and intensified
the debate. Workman, supra note 63. One student described as "bizarre" the view that freedom of
speech permits some students to place others in fear through racial insults. Id. In addition, an
electronic bulletin board in the university's mainframe computer containing racist and sexist jokes
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a revised student conduct code prohibiting words intended to harm or
harass, "directly addressed" to a specific person, and containing "words,
pictures or symbols that are commonly understood to convey in a direct
and visceral way, hatred or contempt" for a particular race or sex.66 The
Stanford law faculty were divided on whether the new measure met first
amendment standards.67
6. University of Massachusetts. -In October 1986, the New York
Mets baseball team defeated the Boston Red Sox in the final game of the
World Series. At Amherst, over one thousand students who had been
watching the game-some of whom were intoxicated-poured out of
dormitories onto the campus shortly after midnight. 68 Skirmishes broke
out.69 When a small group of black students arrived, the violence inten-
sified.70 Ten students were injured, including one black who was left in a
neck brace and crutches.71 A state commission criticized the university,
finding the brawl "predictable, preventable and primarily racially moti-
vated.' ' 72 The university punished the instigators, 73 instituted special
classes and events on racial tolerance, and renewed the school's dedica-
tion to affirmative action.74 These measures failed to prevent further ra-
cial outbreaks.75 On March 12, over two hundred minority students
was shut down. Workman, Unplugging Racist Jokes Starts Furor at Stanford, San Fransisco Chron.,
Feb. 1, 1989, at A4, col. 5.
66 Barringer, supra note 64. The other protected classifications include sexual orientation, reli-
gion, and national and ethnic origin. Id.
67 Professor Thomas Grey, who helped draft the new code, stated that the code was constitu-
tional because it only covered "fighting words" in face-to-face situations. See infra notes 276-319 and
accompanying text (discussing this doctrine). Others were more doubtful. Curtis, Attacks on Ra-
cism Can Imperil Freedom of Speech, San Francisco Chron., Sept. 18, 1989, at A8, col. 1. Stanford
is, of course, a private university and not bound by the first amendment; nevertheless, the drafters
chose the first amendment as their standard.
68 Wald, Racism Blamed for Brawl at U. of Massachusetts, N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1987, at A12,
col. 4.
69 Id.
70 State Starting an Investigation of Clash at Massachussetts U, N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1986, at
B24, col. 1.
71 Id.
72 Wald, supra note 68. The report was issued by the Massachusetts Commission Against Dis-
crimination. The author, Frederick A. Hurst, wrote that the students perceived the Mets as a
"black" team and the Red Sox as a "white" team. Accordingly, the crowd focused on the black
students as surrogate targets for their anger over the "white" team's loss. Id.
73 Id. On February 2, 1987, a New Hampshire District Court sentenced one of the white stu-
dents to three days in jail (suspended); one year probation, and $115 fine for shoving a black student
during the fight. U Mass Student Fined For Brawl, N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1987, at A25, col. 2.
74 Gold, Cordiality and Racial Anger Mix in Massachusetts U. Protest, N.Y. Times, Feb. 16,
1988, at A10, col. 1.
75 On the weekend of February 6 and 7, 1987, five white students assaulted and beat two black
students, who filed complaints with the campus police. Shortly thereafter, a white student informed
campus police that she had been harassed by a black man. Officers allegedly selected seven black
students at random for an on-site line-up. Blacks charged that the attack and line-up were racially
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occupied the university's African-American Studies building. 76 The oc-
cupation ended five days later when the university agreed to many of the
students' demands, including revision of the student conduct code to
punish racially motivated violence.77
7 University of Michigan.-In January 1987, a group of black wo-
men meeting in a lounge on the Ann Arbor campus found a stack of
handbills declaring "open hunting season" on all blacks. 78 A nineteen-
year-old white underclassman admitted to distributing them and was dis-
ciplined,79 a result many white students thought too severe. A short time
later, a disc jockey for the campus radio station encouraged listeners to
call the station and tell racist jokes on the air.Y° Other students estab-
lished a computerized file which contained racist jokes, accessible
through a password.81
After these and other incidents, 82 the Regents approved a new stu-
dent conduct code covering several categories of harassment. 83 The pol-
icy, which purported to balance free speech with the university's need to
deter racist conduct, set varying standards for different locations around
motivated and demanded that those responsible be punished. Massachusetts U. Scene of Protest,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1988, § 1, at 7, col. 1.
Although the Chancellor condemned both events and disciplined two of the perpetrators, some
still considered the response inadequate. Id.; Gold, Blacks Postpone a Meeting on Resolving Campus
Sit-In, N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1988, § 1, at 26, col. 1.
76 Massachusetts U. Scene of Protest, N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1988, § 1, at 7, col. 1. The protesters
also included a number of Hispanics and American Indians. Gold, supra note 74.
77 Gold, Students End Takeover at U. of Massachusetts, N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1988, at A16, col.
5. Other terms of the agreement included: identifying the New Africa House as more of a cultural
center for minorities and accelerating its renovation; setting a goal of 50% increase in minority
student enrollment; exploring new courses on minority culture and history; studying possible expan-
sion of cafeteria menus to include ethnic foods; and forming a student group to monitor the univer-
sity's progress in all these areas. Id. At the time of writing, Massachusetts had not yet enacted a
rule limiting racial speech.
78 Wilkerson, Campus Race Incidents Disquiet U. of Michigan, N.Y. Times, Mar. 9, 1987, at
A12, col. 1.
79 Student Admits Racial Act, N.Y. Times, March 12, 1987, at A28, col. 6. The student was
evicted from his dormitory and barred from university housing. Id.
80 The university dismissed him and shut down the station. Wilkerson, supra note 78.
81 Wilkerson, Ethnic Jokes in Campus Computer Prompt Debate, N.Y. Times, Apr. 18, 1987, § 1,
at 6, col. 3. The collection contained jokes on about 300 different subjects, and was preceded by a
warning that they might offend certain people. Id. Black students charged that some of the jokes
were racist and demanded that the university take action. Others countered that the file was pro-
tected by the first amendment. After the joke file was closed, other students opened new files con-
taining equally offensive jokes-and also essays on the evils of racial bigotry. Id.
82 Other incidents include a February 1988 distribution of handbills stating that blacks should be
"hanging from trees" instead of attending college classes, Wilkerson, Campus Blacks Feel Racism's
Nuances, N.Y. Times, Apr. 17, 1988, § 1, at 1, col. 3, and the continued vandalizing of the shanties
constructed to protest South African apartheid. Wilkerson, supra note 78.
83 DISCRIMINATION AND DISCRIMINATORY HARASSMENT BY STUDENTS IN THE UNIVERSITY
ENVIRONMENT, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN (adopted April 14, 1988).
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the campus. 84 With respect to conduct in classrooms and other academic
settings, the policy prohibited any verbal or physical behavior which (1)
"stigmatizes or victimizes" any individual on the basis of thirteen differ-
ent cultural characteristics (including race, sex, ethnicity, and religion),
and (2) threatens or interferes with the individual's university activities
or "creates an intimidating, hostile or demeaning environment.185 Sane-
tions ranged from formal reprimands to expulsion.8 6
A short time later, a graduate student represented by the American
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) sued Michigan on the ground that its pol-
icy violated the first amendment.8 7 A United States District Court
struck down the policy in August 1989, finding its provisions unconstitu-
tionally vague.88 The university replaced the policy with one that bars
slurs directed at specific individuals8 9 but exempts statements made dur-
ing classroom discussion. 90
& University of Wisconsin at Madison.-In May 1987, members of
the Madison chapter of the Phi Gamma Delta (PGD) fraternity spon-
sored their annual "Fiji Island" party,91 as part of which they erected a
fifteen-foot high plywood caricature of a black man with a bone through
his nose92 and paraded in black face-paint and tropical garb.93 When
black students picketed the house, the caricature was removed, only to be
erected again the next day. 94 This sparked a further round of protests,95
84 These standards were based on the degree of expression deemed consistent with the univer-
sity's academic mission at each location (public forums, academic and educational centers, and uni-
versity housing). Id. At public forums, such as plazas and student newspapers, the policy permits
the "most wide-ranging freedom of speech." Id. At academic and educational centers, prohibited




87 The complaint charged that the provisions "create a chilling effect on the expression of certain
ideas because of the content of those ideas." Michigan U is Sued Over Anti-bias Policy, N.Y. Times,
May 27, 1989, § 1, at 8, col. 3.
88 Doe v. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852, 866 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
89 Heller, U. of Michigan Scales Back Its Rules on Discrimination and Harassment, Chron.
Higher Educ., Sept. 27, 1989, at A3, col. 1.
90 Id. The ACLU has called the new policy an improvement. Id. The university aims to issue a
permanent policy in the near future. Id.
91 Selby & Schultz, "Fiji" Party Frat Gets UW Suspension, Capital Times, May 15, 1987, at 1,
col. 6. Phi Gamma Deltas are known informally as "Fijis."
92 Segall, Blacks Protest Frat Caricature, Wis. St. J., May 4, 1987, § 1, at 1, col. 1.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Selby, Frats Caricature Triggers Blacks' Call for UWReform, Capital Times, May 4, 1987, at
1, col. 2; Selby, UW Sets Discussion on Racism, Capital Times, May 5, 1987, at 23, col. 1. The
fraternity president apologized, stating that the character was intended to represent a Fiji Island
inhabitant, not a black person. This statement predictably angered several Fijian students. Smith,
Frat Irks Platteville Fjian, Wis. St. J., May 5, 1987, § 1, at 1, col. 1.
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which subsided only when the university suspended PGD96 and ordered
its members to undergo sensitivity training.
97
One week after PGD was reinstated, the predominantly Jewish Zeta
Beta Tau (ZBT) fraternity held a closed party. Uninvited PGD members
appeared and made racial and ethnic slurs,98 which provoked a brawl.
The university immediately resuspended PGD, 99 but an independent in-
vestigator recommended reversal. The acting chancellor lifted the
group's suspension and apologized. 10 0 One month later, the university
concluded that, while the racist remarks were "reprehensible," they were
not punishable under the existing student conduct code and, further,
were protected by the first amendment. 10 1 Jewish and black student
groups were outraged.102 In February 1988, Chancellor Donna Shalala
unveiled the "Madison Plan," a sweeping program aimed at improving
recruitment and retention of minorities of color.
103
In April 1988, Wisconsin Professor Harold Scheub was conducting
an exam for his African Storyteller course when six men entered and
disrupted the proceedings. 04 Two hours later, Professor Linda Hunter,
96 The suspension meant that the organization lost its university recognition. The disciplinary
action was viewed as a compromise between black students and the university administration, which
had been considering only a written condemnation before holding the closed-door meeting with
black students. Selby & Schultz, supra note 91. In explaining the suspension, one university official
stated, "Our statements about racism would be meaningless if we were to pay no further attention to
the unintended message... communicated by such an event." Id.
97 Regeth, Sigma Alpha Epsilon Cleared, FIJI Suspended After Racism Inquiries, (Univ. Wis.)
Badger Herald, June 15, 1987, at 4, col. 1.
98 Schmeling & Pitman, University Suspends Fraternity: Anti-Semitism Among Latest Fiji Accu-
sations, Capital Times, Oct. 31, 1987, at 1, col. 5.
99 Id.; Allegretti, UW Indifference Cited in Racism, Capital Times, Nov. 2, 1987, at 1, ol. 5.
Although PGD officers denied any racial intent and characterized the incident as just another "after-
bars" fight, they nevertheless suspended five members responsible for the fracas. Schultze, Madison
Fraternity Suspends 2, Milwaukee J., Nov. 3, 1987, at IA, col. 2.
100 Riddle, "Fifi" Fraternity Suspension Lifted, Wis. St. J., Nov. 8, 1987, § 1, at 12, col. 1. Uni-
versity officials concluded that the suspension probably was in violation of the fraternity members'
due process rights, since no determination had been made that the individuals were acting in an
individual or representative capacity. Id.; see also Smith, UW Takes Heat from Clearing Frats, Wis.
St. J., Dec. 17, 1987, § 1, at 1, col. 5.
101 Schumacher, Two Face Discipline in Frat Incident, Wis. Week, Jan. 13, 1988, at 3, col. 2. The
school eventually would hold disciplinary hearings for one ZBT member for his role in the fight and
for one PGD member who also fought and refused to participate in the investigation. Smith, supra
note 100.
102 Smith, Frat Fight Ruling Takes More Heat, Wis. St. J., Dec. 19, 1987, § 4, at 1, col. 3.
103 Mow & Bernstein, On Changing Academic Culture from the Inside: An Interview with Donna
Shalala, CHANGE, Jan./Feb. 1989, at 26; Schumacher, The Madison Plan: Shalala Says Bold Effort
Requires Deep Commitment, Wis. Week, Feb. 10, 1988, at 1, col. 2. Shalala aimed to double the
number of minority students within five years and to add over 200 new minority faculty and aca-
demic staff within three years. An Ethnic Studies course requirement, a multi-cultural center, and
an outreach program to neighboring schools included among the features of the program.
104 Segall, Disruptions at UWSeen as Racial, Wis. St. J., Apr. 15, 1988, at IA, ol. 2. According
to Scheub, the men stayed in the examination room for 10 minutes during which they hurled obscen-
ities and left an exam book filled with pornography. Id.
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while teaching an African languages course, was harassed by six men
who set off a stink bomb in the classroom before fleeing.105 University
investigators found that the intruders, primarily members of the Univer-
sity of Illinois chapter of the Acacia fraternity, acted with racial motiva-
tion 10 6 and the complicity of the group's Madison chapter.107 The
university suspended the local chapter for one year,103 and a number of
the Illinois members pleaded no contest to criminal charges. 10 9
One year after being victimized by ethnic and racial slurs, the Wis-
consin chapter of ZBT sponsored a "slave auction" fundraiser at a pri-
vate home.1 10 The auction included several skits, including one in which
pledges wore black face-paint and Afro wigs, and lip-synched Jackson
Five songs; and another in which a male pledge, also in blackface and
wig, impersonated Oprah Winfrey while two other males taunted the
pledge sexually. 11 When a student committee concluded that the frater-
nity violated no campus rule and that the skits were protected speech,'
12
two hundred demonstrators occupied the administration building in a
"day of rage." 113 Chancellor Shalala agreed to some of the group's de-
mands, but refused to expel the ZBT members on the ground that their
105 Id.
106 Acacia Frat Leader Disputes Racism Claim, Wis. St. J., May 12, 1988, at 3B, col. 4. The
Illinois Acacia chapter suspended 15 other members, while the chapter itself was barred by the
University of Illinois for one year. Id.
107 Esposito, Acacia is a Scapegoat, Fraternity Officer Says, Milwaukee J., May 6, 1988, at 413, col.
3.
108 Id. The suspension resulted in the fraternity's loss of the University of Wisconsin name, ac-
cess to student facilities and mailing labels, participation in intramural sports, and membership in
the Interfraternity Council. Id.
109 They were sentenced to probation for disorderly conduct and unauthorized presence and re-
quired to write essays about the incident or on black history and literature. Four members were also
required to issue an apology letter to the University of Wisconsin, donate $50 to charity, and per-
form 100 hours of community service. Worthington, U. of Wisconsin Regents Move to Rein in Ra-
cism, Chicago Tribune, Apr. 12, 1989, at Cl, col. 1.
Compare the Acacia case with Furumoto v. Lyman, 362 F. Supp. 1267 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (up-
holding discipline of students who disrupted William Shockley's classes at Stanford University;
Shockley was a principal proponent of race-IQ theories which many considered racist).
110 Trebach, Student Group Tested in ZBT Pledge Case, Wis. Week, Oct. 26, 1988, at 1, col. 4.
111 Schmeling, Lack of Action Against ZBTs Enrages Blacks, Capital Times, Nov. 15, 1988, at 1,
col. 1. After the skits, ZBT members entered bids for the performers' services. Smith, "Slave Auc-
tion" Spurs Protests, UW Outrage, Wis. St. J., Oct. 25, 1988, at IA, col. 2.
112 Trebach, supra note 110. The investigating committee was composed of five students, one
faculty member, one academic staff member, and a representative from the Dean of Students office.
The authority to discipline student groups had been transferred to the committee from the Dean of
Students. See also Smith, Lawyer: Frat Action Protected by Law, Wis. St. J., Oct. 26, 1988, at 1B,
col. 1.
113 Smith, Anti-Racism Protesters to Talk to Shalala Today, Wis. St. J., Nov. 8, 1988, at IB, col. 3.
The Minority Coalition, a group of student minorities, demanded that a panel of administrators and
minority students be formed to replace the student committee because it was ineffective in handling
the "auction" incident. Id.
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actions were constitutionally protected.1 14 Once again, black students
took to the streets. 115 Subsequently, the Wisconsin student association
stripped the committee of authority over complaints of racism and sex-
ism, 116 and the Interfraternity Council suspended the fraternity for five
years. 117 Eventually, Chancellor Shalala tightened control over campus
fraternities and sororities," 18 and promulgated a new code of student con-
duct punishing racial speech and behavior. 19 The Wisconsin ACLU re-
cently filed suit to declare the university's new policy unconstitutional. 120
9. Summary.-As previously noted, racial incidents have taken
place at many campuses. A review of the more celebrated incidents indi-
cates that in several cases-Michigan, Wisconsin, Massachusetts, Berke-
ley and Stanford-the incidents led to enactment of antiracism rules. In
others-Dartmouth, The Citadel, and Columbia-no rules were enacted.
There seems to be little correlation between the seriousness or number of
incidents and the enactment of rules. Some universities have responded
quickly to a small number of incidents; others have ignored serious un-
rest or declared themselves unable to act. Whether a campus ultimately
adopts an antiracism rule or not, the mere suggestion of such rules gener-
ates controversy. The next subpart reviews that controversy, focusing
particularly on arguments against rules limiting racial speech.
B. The Current Debate
In response to the rising number of racial incidents, nearly a dozen
colleges and universities have adopted student conduct codes or revised
old ones to cope with the new wave of unrest. 12 1 These rules and policies
114 Smith, Shalala to Appoint Greek Review Panel, Wis. St. J., Nov. 9, 1988, at IC, col. 1. Shalala
agreed to establish a committee to study Wisconsin's long-term goal for minority retention and to re-
examine the future of fraternities on the campus. See Stein, Student Panel Takes No Action Against
Fraternity, Milwaukee Sentinel, Nov. 15, 1988, at lB, col. 1.
115 Schmeling, supra note 111.
116 Nowlen, WSA Seeks Disciplinary Changes, Wis. Week, Nov. 30, 1988, at 1, col. 5.
117 Miller, Fraternities Come Down Hard on ZBT, Wis. St. J., Nov. 22, 1988, at 1, col. 2.
118 Campus Life: Wisconsin; Racist Acts Inspire a Call for Control over Fraternities, N.Y. Times,
May 21, 1989, § 1, at 52, col. 5. Shalala's proposal marked the end of a 20-year "hands-off" policy
regarding Wisconsin fraternities. Id,
119 UNIV. WIS. STAT. § 17.06(2)(a), supra note 4. The rule is binding on the entire University of
Wisconsin system.
120 U.W.M. Post, Inc. v. Regents, University of Wisconsin, No. 90-C-328 (pending in the E.D.
Wis.). See Jones, UWRacism Rule to Begin Friday Despite Criticism, Milwaukee J., Sept. 20, 1989,
at IB, col. 1.
121 Wilson, Colleges' Anti-Harassment Policies Bring Controversy Over Free-Speech Issues, Chron.
Higher Educ., Oct. 4, 1989, at Al, col. 2. Institutions that have already adopted policies include
Emory University, the Universities of Texas, Wisconsin, California, Connecticut, Michigan, North
Carolina at Chapel Hill and Pennsylvania, Brown University, Pennsylvania State University, Trinity
College, Mt. Holyoke, and Tufts University. Institutions currently considering anti-harassment poli-
cies include Stanford, Eastern Michigan, Colorado, and Arizona State. In early October of 1989,
Tufts's administrators rescinded its policy, which had identified specific areas of campus where
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have drawn fire from commentators ranging from political conservatives
to first amendment absolutists.
L The University as "Bastion ofFreedom "--A frequent argument
against campus antiracism rules is that they run counter to the ideal of
the university as a bastion of free thought. Describing the campus as
"the locus of the freest expression to be found anywhere," where the
unpopular truth may be "pursued-and imparted with impunity," Pro-
fessor Chester Finn decries any effort to limit that freedom. 122 Many
contend that anti-harassment policies, even those aimed only at face-to-
face insults, might chill academic exchange or teaching. 123 Further, they
argue that "chill" of expression operates only in one direction: Professor
Alan Charles Kors charges that at most campuses a white male can be
insulted and disparaged with relative impunity. 124 Minority protectors
often respond by transferring the debate outside the realm of speech.
Martha Minow, for example, focuses on the way racist insults stigmatize
the victim, and draws a line between speech and harassment.1 25
Dartmouth President James 0. Freedman responded to criticism of his
attack on the Dartmouth Review by describing the conflict not as a mat-
"demeaning" speech was restricted, believing that the policy would probably fail a court challenge.
Ingalls, Tufts Rescinds Controversial Policy Limiting Free Speech in Certain Areas, Chron. Higher
Educ., Oct. 11, 1989, at A3, col. 1.
Most rules are patterned after the "fighting words" exception of Chaplinsky v. New Hamsphire,
315 U.S. 568 (1946), or in terms of the tort of severe emotional distress. Mt. Holyoke, a private
college, has adopted a standard prohibiting--"unwelcome slurs, jokes, graphic written materials as
well as all other verbal or physical actions related to an individual's personal background or attrib-
utes," MT. HOLYOKE COLLEGE STATEMENT ON HUMAN RIGHTS (Oct. 1989) (on file with the au-
thor)--that appears to track no recognized exception to the first amendment.
Most policies contain detailed procedures for resolving complaints as well as substantive stan-
dards. Many university schemes emphasize informal resolution. If this approach fails or the griev-
ant chooses not to -pursue informal procedures, the university may institute formal proceedings.
Most university rules provide for punishment, such as a reprimand, community service, or suspen-
sion, if there exists "clear and convincing evidence," see, eg., University of Michigan policy, or if
there exists a "reasonable basis for believing" that a violation has occurred. See, eg., Mt. Holyoke
College policy. Most policies provide the accused with the right to appeal an adverse decision. See,
eg., University of Wisconsin policy.
122 Finn, The Campus: "An Island of Repression In a Sea of Freedom," COMMENTARY 17, 18
(1989). Finn, professor of education and public policy at Vanderbilt University, states that academic
freedom is the only difference that separates our universities from those in totalitarian countries. Id.;
see also Hentoff, supra note 26 ("If students are to be 'protected' from bad ideas, how are they to
learn to identify and cope with them?"); Washburn, Liberalism Versus Free Speech, 40 NAT'L REV.
39, 41 (1988) (free inquiry is the bedrock upon which a liberal education is built).
123 Finn, supra note 122, at 18-19 (referring to historian Stephan Thernstrom, who was criticized
by students for reading aloud from a white plantation owner's journals without providing the slaves'
point of view).
124 Kors, It's Speech, Not Sex, the Dean Bans Now, Wall St. J., Oct. 12, 1989, at § 1, at 16, col. 3.
Kors is a professor of history at the University of Pennsylvania.
125 Minow, Looking Ahead to the 1990's: Constitutional Law and American Colleges and Uni-
versities, Keynote Address to the National Association of Colleges and Universities Attorneys Meet-
ing (June 28, 1989).
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ter of "expression," but as one of protecting academic diversity. 126
2. In Loco Parentis.--Opponents of campus antiracism rules also
charge that the rules represent a throwback to the days when colleges
and universities functioned in loco parentis.127 Professor Finn points out
that although campuses have refused to regulate student sexuality and
alcohol and drug consumption, they are nevertheless anxious to prohibit
offensive speech.128 Professor Minow, on the other hand, points out that
"neutrality does not mean no state regulation. The state is not neutral
when it permits some private groups to wield power over others." 129
3. Protecting the Vulnerable.-In his long-running battle with the
Dartmouth Review, President Freedman emphasized that an academic
institution has a responsibility toward the potential victim of racial har-
assment and insult. 130 Conservatives reject this idea,131 arguing that
speech cannot be bad merely because it permits individuals to say bad
things.13 2 Contrary views are an inherent part of an intellectual commu-
nity; persons who are "hurt by strong expressions of disagreement belong
not in a university, but in a Trappist monastery."' 133 Other writers, how-
ever, reply that the injury of a racist insult is not just an individual one,
but a collective injury that the community may, and should, address.134
4. The Politics of Tolerance. -Many writers who question campus
antiracism rules maintain that the new restrictions are motivated more
by politics than the need to protect racial minorities. Robert M. O'Neil
views the question as whether "special interests" should override free
speech protections. 135 Others see the new policies as thinly veiled efforts
to privilege a liberal agenda, 136 pointing out that higher education's tol-
erance for scathing speech seems to vary with the ideology of the
126 Gold, supra note 39.
127 Finn, supra note 122, at 18. The in loco parentis doctrine held that colleges and universities
operated as surrogate parents, responsible for the health and moral well-being of students. Eg., M.
OLIVAS, THE LAW AND HIGHER EDUCATION 599-615 (1989).
128 Id.; see also Kors, supra note 124.
129 Minow, supra note 125 (raising possibility that this view may lead to an overactive state).
130 Washburn, supra note 122, at 39. Freedman added that "because freedom of expression has
the capacity to wound the feelihgs of members of the community, colleagues also have the responsi-
bility to provide support for those who have been wounded." Id.
131 Washburn, for example, writes that if we want free expression to yield to the sensitivities of
the individual, the entire nature of the university must change. Id. at 40.
132 Seligman, The Speech Suppression Movement, 119 FORTUNE 195, 196 (June 19, 1989).
133 Washburn, supra note 122, at 39.
134 See Note, A Communitarian Defense of Group Libel Laws, 101 HARV. L. REv. 682 (1988).
135 O'Neil, supra note 10. O'Neil served as president and professor of law at University of
Virginia.
136 See Kors, supra note 124; see also Bernstein, supra note 2 (Thomas Short, professor of philoso-




speaker. 137 George Will, for example, questions whether rules banning
items offensive to the right-"unpatriotic, irreligious or sexually explicit
expressions"-would be graciously accepted by leftist endorsers of an-
tiracism rules.138 Thomas Sowell labels antiracism rules desperate at-
tempts by liberals to cover up the failures of affirmative action. 139
Minority protectors respond that protecting people of color from dispar-
aging treatment is a matter not of politics but human decency, and is
deeply rooted in our tradition of constitutional equality. 140
5. A Better Way?-Some opponents of antiracism rules urge that
"[m]ore speech, not less, is the proper cure for offensive speech."' 141 Jon
Weiner, for example, calls on universities to speak out forcefully and fre-
quently on why racist speech is objectionable. 142 Others urge that uni-
versities focus on underlying racist attitudes, rather than on their
outward manifestations, 143 or address racism through teaching and ex-
ample. 144 The soundness of these and related arguments is detailed later
in this Article.
III. INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES
This Part examines the experience of other nations in regulating ra-
cially offensive speech. The United States has relatively little experience
in doing so; most of the regulations have been recent, highly controver-
sial, and centered on college campuses. The debate surrounding campus
antiracism rules swirls around a number of issues that have empirical
components-questions that might be answered yes or no. Can free
speech continue to exist in a society that prohibits one of its forms? Will
one type of regulation lead to another, or conversely, will enforcement
inevitably be turned against minorities? Are laws limiting racist speech
137 Finn, supra note 122, at 21; Washburn, supra note 122, at 40-41 (listing occasions where
unpopular speakers have been silenced by campus protesters who have gone unpunished).
138 Will, supra note 10, at 71-72; see also Will, supra note 9. Will uses the Christian crucifix as an
example. He concludes that members of the left will bestir themselves when the Ku Klux Klan burn
this symbol, while the right reacts when pop singer Madonna uses it in her provocative musical
performances. Id.
139 Sowell, Campuses Attempting to Mask Truth By Closing Mouths, Rocky Mt. News, Apr. 16,
1990, at B22, col. I.
140 See, eg., Matsuda, supra note 25; Lawrence, supra note 2.
141 Barringer, supra note 64; see also Will, supra note 10, at 72 (purpose of our system of constitu-
tional liberty is not to immunize ideas from criticism, but rather to expose them to it).
142 Wiener, Racial Hatred on Campus, THE NAION, Feb. 27, 1989, at 260, 262. Mr. Wiener is a
professor of history at UC Irvine.
143 Finn challenges academic institutions to focus on providing high quality education to minor-
ity students to increase their matriculation rate, rather than waste resources on preventing
"naughty" conduct. Finn, supra note 122, at 22; see also Barringer, supra note 64 (Ira Glasser,
executive director of the ACLU, believes that speech-repressing rules avoid dealing with the underly-
ing problem of racial prejudice).
144 See O'Neil, supra note 22.
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effective compared with other approaches to controlling racism? The de-
bate about campus rules has proceeded largely in an empirical vacuum.
Although one must always be cautious in drawing conclusions from the
experiences of other cultures, those experiences may nevertheless suggest
answers to these questions.
A. International Conventions and Declarations
Many countries have condemned discrimination and racial violence.
This condemnation has taken a number of forms, including international
treaties and conventions, many enacted in response to the atrocities in-
fficted upon Jews and other minorities during World War 11.145 For ex-
ample, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides that persons
are entitled to protectioh from discrimination and its incitement.1 46 The
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms1 47 and the American Declaration of the Rights and
Duties of Man 148 provide similar protections. 149 The Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 150 requires states
to prohibit "direct and public incitement" to commit that crime.1 51 The
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 152 which affirms
freedom of expression, nevertheless states that "advocacy of national, ra-
cial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hos-
145 Jones, Article 4 of the International Convention of the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination and the First Amendment, 23 How. L.J. 429,436 (1980); see also Kretzmer, Freedom
of Speech and Racism, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 445 (1987); Matsuda, supra note 25.
According to the leading international authorities, the principle of racial nondiscrimination is
securely enshrined in the body of international law. See I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 598-601 (4th ed. 1990) (principle of protecting minorities from discrimina-
tion now securely established in international law); see also J. INGLES, POSITIVE MEASURES
DESIGNED TO ERADICATE ALL INCITEMENT TO, OR ACTS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION: IMPLE-
MENTATION OF ARTICLE 4 OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL
FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION (1986); Kretzmer, supra, at 447; Jones, supra, at 436. Interna-
tional agreements emphasize the prevention of racial and ethnic discrimination more than any other
single category of human rights. McDougal, Lasswell & Chen, The Protection of Respect and
Human Rights: Freedom of Choice and World Public Order, 24 AM. U.L. REV. 919, 1075 (1975)
("There is a clear trend towards including constitutional provisions which not only guarantee equal-
ity before the law, but which specifically provide against racial discrimination."); see also Greenburg,
Race, Sex, and Religious Discrimination in International Law, in T. MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES 307, 309 (1984).
146 G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948).
147 Convention For the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950,
213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Fundamental Freedoms].
148 American Convention on Human Rights, OEA/ser. K/ XVI/1.1, doc. 65 rev. 3 (1970), re-
printed in 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 99 (1970) [hereinafter American Convention].
149 Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 147, art. 14, at 232; American Convention, supra note
148, art. 1.1, at 101.
150 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78
U.N.T.S. 277, 280.
151 Id. at 280 (art. 3(c)).
152 G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
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tility or violence shall be prohibited by law." 153
The most important and specific piece of antiracism legislation,
however, is the International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination. 154 Signed by 104 states,155 the Conven-
tion provides that:
The concern of the United Nations with the promotion and protection of
human rights and fundamental freedoms is an expression of the ever-in-
creasing interest of the international community in ensuring that these
rights and freedoms shall be enjoyed by all human beings everywhere....
[R]acial discrimination has been and is considered to be one of the most
odious of human rights violations. 156
The Convention's central provision is article 4, which requires member
countries to criminalize dissemination of hate propaganda and all organi-
zations that incite racial discrimination. 157 The General Assembly
adopted this article only after heated debate, 58 yet most signatory na-
tions have followed its mandate in enacting national legislation. 159
153 Id. at 55 (art. 20, § 2).
154 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened
for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 [hereinafter International Convention]. The Interna-
tional Convention was signed but not ratified by the United States on September 28, 1966. Id. at 303.
155 N. LERNER, THE U.N. CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION 155-56 (2d ed. 1980).
156 Dore, United Nations Measures to Combat Racial Discrimination: Progress and Problems in
Retrospect, 10 DENVER J. INT'L L. PoL'Y 299, 299-300 (1981).
157 States Parties condemn all propaganda and all organizations which are based on ideas or
theories of superiority of one race or group of persons of one colour or ethnic origin, or which
attempt to justify or promote racial hatred and discrimination in any form... :
(a) Shall declare an offense punishable by law all dissemination of ideas based on racial
superiority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimination, as well as all acts of violence or incite-
ment to such acts against any race or group of persons of another colour or ethnic origin ....
(b) Shall declare illegal and prohibit organizations... which promote and incite racial
discrimination ....
(c) Shall not permit public authorities or public institutions, national or local, to promote
or incite racial discrimination.
International Convention, supra note 154, at art. 4.
158 J. INGLES, supra note 145, at 1. Although the United States is a member of several interna-
tional organizations which have promulgated legislation denouncing racism, it has not ratified the
International Convention. The United States supported the Convention with this reservation:
The Constitution of the United States contains provisions for the protection of individual rights
such as the right of free speech, and nothing in the Convention shall be deemed to require or to
authorize legislation or other action by the United States of America incompatible with the
provisions of the Constitution of the United States of America.
International Convention, supra note 154.
159 Kretzmer, supra note 145, at 500. A small minority of states formulated declarations and
reservations regarding article 4, and some have not carried out their obligation under that article to
adopt the required legislation. Meron, The Meaning and Reach of the International Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 79 AM. J. INT. L. 283, 316 (1985). However,
a large number of states have made efforts to implement all or part of their obligations under the
Convention. N. LERNER, supra note 155, at 166.
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B. Case Studies
1. Great Britain.-Legal treatment of racial hatred in Great Brit-
ain began in 1732 with R. v. Osborn.160 Osborn accused "several Jews"
of murdering a woman and her child because the father was a Chris-
tian. 161 When some readers attacked and injured a group of Jews, 162 the
public prosecutor charged Osborn with seditious libel. The court, how-
ever, stated that the foundation of this case was incitement to commit
breach of the peace. 163 Although Osborn was convicted, 164 later cases
narrowed Osborn in various ways.' 65 Parliament responded by criminal-
izing hate speech in the Public Order Act of 1936.166 With the rise of
neo-Nazism, however, the statute proved inadequate.' 67 The Race Rela-
tions Act of 1965168 was the culmination of several earlier attempts to
broaden and conform British law to international trends. 169 The Act cre-
ated a new offense for persons who:
with intent to stir up hatred against any section of the public ... distin-
guished by colour, race or ethnic or national origins- . . . publish[ ] or
distribute[ ] written matter which is threatening, abusive or insulting; or...
use[ ] in any public place or at any public meeting words which are threat-
ening, abusive or insulting, being matter or words likely to stir up
hatred .... 
170
The Act was a compromise. Civil libertarians successfully insisted
that provisions be incorporated to prevent the measure from becoming
an unreasonable infringement on speech. 171 Included were provisos that:
(1) prosecutions could only be carried out with the consent of the Attor-
ney General; 172 (2) the statute would apply only to distribution of materi-
160 R. v. Osborn, 25 Eng. Rep. 584 (K.B. 1732).
161 Id. at 585.
162 Id.
163 Id. At common law, criminal sanctions had long existed against those who incited others to
bigotry if their actions were likely to disturb the peace. A. LESTER & G. BINDMAN, RACE AND
LAW IN GREAT BRITAIN 344 (1972).
164 R. v. Osborn, 25 Eng. Rep. at 585.
165 For example, King v. Caunt, (unreported) held that the prosecution must prove intent to in-
cite. B. Cox, CIVIL LIBERTIES IN BRITAIN 231 (1975).
166 Public Order Act, 1936, 1 Edw. 8 & 1 Geo. 6, ch. 6, § 5; see McCrudden, British Anti-Discrim-
ination Law: An Introduction, 2 DICK. INT'L L. ANN. 65 (1983).
167 McCrudden, supra note 166, at 66.
168 Race Relations Act, 1965, ch. 73, § 6(1) (amended in 1976 and 1986) [hereinafter 1965 Act].
169 McCrudden, supra note 166, at 66-67; see also Shemonsky, The Exclusion of Religion From
Great Britain's Race Relations Act: "Sikh" and Ye Shall Find a Violation of Human Rights Obliga-
tions, 14 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 87 (1984).
170 1965 Act, supra note 168.
171 Speech of the Home Secretary, Sir F. Soskie, 711 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 926, 933-37
(1965).
172 1965 Act, supra note 168.
This removes the matter from the hands of the local police and rules out private prosecutions.
The Attorney General is likely to be more sensitive to the potential threat to freedom of speech
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als or words spoken in public; 173 (3) only "threatening, abusive or
insulting" speech would be covered; 174 (4) intent must be shown; 175 and
(5) the' racial group victimized must be one residing within Great
Britain. 1
76
Under the revised statute, few prosecutions occurred. 177 R. v. Han-
cock 178 indicated additional lacunae in the act. In Hancock, a white su-
premacist group distributed pamphlets proclaiming that nonwhites were
genetically inferior and should be returned to their countries of origin. 
179
The wording was pseudoscientific and avoided language of threat or in-
citement, and the defendant was acquitted. 180 Britain responded by abol-
ishing the element of intent from the Act, 181 so that prosecution could be
based on the objective likelihood of a speech-act's stirring up hatred.
182
The Act was once again modified in 1986.183 The new Act permits a
stemming from the law's liberal application than local police, who are likely to be more con-
cerned with public peace considerations.
Kretzmer, supra note 145, at 502; see also McCrudden, supra note 166, at 67.
173 1965 Act, supra note 168.
174 Id. "On one hand, the terms used are relatively broad, thus leaving the statute open to vague-
ness and overbreadth arguments. On the other hand, this restriction would seem to imply that only
cruder forms of racist expression are prohibited. More sophisticated forms of expression are pro-
tected." Kretzmer, supra note 145, at 501.
175 1965 Act, supra note 168.
176 Id.
177 Lasson, Racism in Great Britain: Drawing the Line on Free Speech, 7 B.C. 3RD WORLD L.J.
161, 170 (1987).
178 R. v. Hancock (unreported); see Lasson, supra note 177, at 169. For further discussion of the
case, see Longaker, The Race Relations Act of 1965, 11 RACE 125, 130-42 (1969).
179 R. v. Hancock (unreported); see Lasson, supra note 177, at 169.
180 Id.
181 Race Relations Act, 1976, ch. 74, § 70 [hereinafter 1976 Act]. There may have been a more
insidious reason for the promulgation of this Act, Le., to prevent Asian workers from striking and to
contain the second generation of black youths. "At present, [the blacks'] ... frustration does not
amount to a cohesive political force. Meanwhile, actions... (can) be taken within the present
framework without provoking upheaval and conflict." Thus, the Act can also be seen not as an
instrument of progress, but more as a way to maintain status quo-to nip the black power movement
in the bud. I MACDONALD, RACE RELATIONS-THE NEW LAW 7 (1977).
182 1976 Act, supra note 181.
183 Public Order Act, 1986, ch. 64, §§ 17-18. Sections of the 1986 Act pertinent to racial hatred
are:
§ 17 Meaning of "racial hatred":
In this part "racial hatred" means hatred against a group of persons in Great Britain defined by
reference to colour, race, nationality (including citizenship) or ethnic or national origins. § 18
Use of words or behaviour or display of written material:
(1) A person who uses threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour, or displays any
written material which is threatening, abusive or insulting, is guilty of an offence if-
(a) he intends thereby to stir up racial hatred, or
(b) having regard to all the circumstances racial hatred is likely to be stirred up thereby.
(2) An offence under this sectionmay be committed in public or a private place, except that
no offence is committed where the words or behaviour are used, or the written materials is
displayed, by a person inside a dwelling and are not heard or seen except by other persons in
that or another dwelling.
(3) A constable may arrest without warrant anyone he reasonably suspects is committing an
offence under this section.
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constable to arrest without a warrant "anyone he reasonably suspects is
committing an offense under this section." 184 Moreover, unlike earlier
versions, the statute prohibits private as well as public behavior.1 85 The
Attorney General, however, must still consent to prosecutions.
1 86
Although many are still unsatisfied with the law, few advocate doing
away with it altogether.1 8 7 In the meantime, British courts interpret the
Act narrowly to minimize conflict with free speech. 188
Professor David Kretzmer suggests three ways to interpret the Brit-
ish experience: (1) The British statute goes as far as possible in curbing
free speech-a more effective one would unacceptably impair liberty; (2)
The statute is imperfect, but serves to limit cruder forms of hateful
speech and has some symbolic and educative value; (3) The law in its
current version is inadequate, but having shown that speech may be lim-
ited without dire consequences, it may be expanded cautiously as social
conditions dictate.1 89 In any event, the principal remaining question cen-
ters on whether to remove some of the law's restrictions at the risk of
encroaching even further on free speech.190
(4) In proceedings for an offence under this section it is a defence for the accused to prove that
he was inside a dwelling and had no reason to believe that the words or behaviour used, or the
written material displayed, would be heard or seen by a person outside that or any other
dwelling.
(5) A person who is not shown to have intended to stir up racial hatred is not guilty of an
offence under this section if he did not intend his words or behaviour, or the written material, to
be, and was not aware that it might be, threatening, abusive or insulting.
(6) This section does not apply to words or behaviour used, or written material displayed,
solely for the purpose of being included in a programme broadcast or included in a cable pro-
gramme service.
Id.
184 Id. at § 18(3).
185 Id. at § 18(2); see also Wolffe, Values in Conflict Incitement to Racial Hatred and the Public
Order Act 1986, 1987 PUB. L. 85, 87.
186 Public Order Act, supra note 183. This provision is regarded as the greatest protection to
freedom of speech, since the Attorney General generally will be more sensitive to free speech issues
than the police. Yet critics have charged that this requirement impairs the law's effectiveness by
making enforcement cumbersome. Kretzmer, supra note 145, at 502; Lasson, supra note 177, at 171-
72.
187 Bindman, The Law and Racial Discrimination: Third Thoughts, 3 BRrr. J. LAW & SOC'Y. 110
(1976) (repeal would be seen as condoning racism and would be politically unwise); Matsuda, supra
note 25, at 234 (remaining controversy centers around proposals to lift some of the restrictions
designed to protect freedom of speech). But see Lasson, supra note 177, at 171:
Englishmen have a strong attachment to freedom of speech. The freedom was won ... not
just to enable people to say pleasant, fraternal and acceptable things... but to say distasteful,
unacceptable, provocative, antagonist things. Any criminal statute which is framed to circum-
scribe that freedom is likely to be given a bumpy ride, however desirable or even necessary the
purpose may be.
Id. (quoting London Times, Jan. 9, 1978, at 3, col. 2).
188 Shemonsky, supra note 169, at 88.
189 Kretzmer, supra note 145, at 503-04.
190 Id. at 506.
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2. Canada.-Like Great Britain, Canada has developed a panoply
of measures to protect minorities against racism.1 91 These include the
Constitutional Charter of Rights,192 the Canadian Bill of Rights, 193 cer-
tain provisions of the Canadian Criminal Code, 194 and ten provincial
human rights codes. 195
Under the Canadian Charter of Rights (Canadian Charter) and the
United States Constitution, free expression cases are treated in much the
same way.196 The Canadian Charter guarantees fundamental freedoms
of religion, expression, and association. 197 These liberties are "subject
... to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably
justified in a free and democratic society." 198 To determine the constitu-
tionality of laws limiting speech, a two-step test is used. 199 The first step
is to determine whether an individual right falls under the Charter. The
second is to analyze whether the restriction is justified by an "interest of
sufficient importance to warrant overriding a constitutional right" 20°° and
whether the "means chosen to attain these objectives [are] appropriate or
proportional to the ends." 20 1
Canada's national criminal code prohibited hate speech as early as
June 1970.202 A 1965 Report of the Special Committee on Hate Propa-
191 Britain's measures are statutory and decisional, see supra notes 160-88 and accompanying
text. Canada's include these, plus certain constitutional provisions. See infra notes 192-221 and
accompanying text.
192 CAN. CONSr. pt. 1, §§ 1-34 (1982) [hereinafter Charter].
193 Id.
194 Canadian Criminal Code, R.S.C. ch. C-46, §§ 319.1, 319.2, 319.3(a)-(d) (1985) (amended by
R.S.C. ch. C-42, § 319.2 (1988)).
195 See Hunter, When Human Rights Become Wrongs, 23 U.W. ONT. L. REV. 197 (1985).
196 Sedler, The Constitutional Protection of Freedom of Religion, Expression, and Association in
Canada and the United States A Comparative Analysis, 20 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 577, 593
(1988) (What emerges from a comparison of the cases that have arisen thus far, however, is a much
higher degree of similarity than of difference).
197 Charter, § 2.
198 Charter, § 1; see Regel, Hate Propaganda: A Reason to Limit Freedom of Speech, 49 SAS-
KATCH. L. REv. 303, 305 (1984).
199 Sedler, supra note 196, at 579-80.
200 Id. at 579-81 (quoting Regina v. Edward Brooks and Art, Ltd., 2 S.C.R. 713 (1986)).
201 Id. (quoting Regina v. Edward Brooks and Art, Ltd., 2 S.C.R. 713 (1986)). Legislation (1)
must be "carefully designed or rationally connected to the objective," (2) must "impair the right as
little as possible," and (3) "must not so severely entrench an individual or groups rights that the
legislative objective, although important, is nevertheless outweighed by the abridgment of rights.
There is a very narrow scope involved here, it is limited to communications with the intention of
promoting hatred." Id. (quoting Regina v. Edward Brooks and Art, Ltd., 2 S.C.R. 713 (1986)).
Under this framework, the Supreme Court in Canada has upheld provisions of the Criminal Code
which prohibit the "spreading of false news likely to cause mischief to the public interest in social
and racial tolerance." Regina v. Zundel (unreported) (Ont. Dist. Ct. 1985), reprinted in LAW RE-
FORM COMMISSION OF CANADA, HATE PROPOGANDA 13 (Working Paper No. 50, 1986) [hereinaf-
ter LAW REFORM].
202 An Act to Amend the Criminal Code, R.S.C. ch. 11 (1970 Ist Supp.) (amending R.S.C. ch.
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ganda2 °3 provided the impetus for Canada's current legislation.204 Par-
liament commissioned the Report in an attempt to understand the origin
and activity of various hate organizations in the country.20 5 Out of the
Report's recommendations 20 6 and the desire to harmonize Canada's leg-
islation with international standards, Canada enacted House of Com-
mons Bill C-320 7 which recognizes four types of hate speech as crimes:
advocating genocide, 20 8 public incitement of hatred, 20 9 willful promotion
of hatred,210 and spreading false news.21' The first was the least contro-
versial; it merely carries out Canada's responsibilities to legislate the pro-
visions of the United Nations Convention on Genocide.212 The second,
public incitement of hatred, 21 3 drew fire; one of the criticisms is that the
reaction of the audience dictates whether or not an offense has oc-
curred.214 The third and fourth provisions, wilful promotion of hatred
other than in a private conversation and spreading false news, have been
rarely applied.2
15
Each of the offenses is subject to a number of defenses-all designed
to protect free expression 216-which together with the requirement of the
C-34. (1970)). Efforts had been underway since 1953 to pass a law regarding hate propaganda. See
LAW REFORM, supra note 201, at 7.
203 HOUSE OF COMMONS, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITrEE ON HATE PROPAGANDA IN
CANADA (1986) [hereinafter Cohen Report].
204 Matsuda, James McCormick Mitchell Lecture, Language as Violence v. Freedom of Expression
& Canadian and American Perspectives on Group Defamation, 37 BUFFALO L. REv. 337, 343 (Spr.
1988/89).
205 Id. The report concluded that hate propaganda was a serious enough problem in Canada to
warrant legislation and that legislation could restrict free speech, but that this freedom "does not
[include] the right to vilify." It also found that race-hate speech serves no valid public purpose, but
represents a "clear and present danger to the function of a democratic society." Cohen Report,
supra note 203, at 14, 24-25.
206 See Cohen Report, supra note 203, at 773.
207 An Act to Amend the Criminal Code, supra note 202.
208 Canadian Criminal Code § 281.1(3). All references to the Canadian Criminal Code are to
R.S.C. ch. C-34 (1970), as amended.
209 Id. at § 281.2(1) (current version at R.S.C. ch. C-46, § 319.1 (1985)).
210 Id. at § 281.2(2) (current version at R.S.C. ch. C-46, § 319.2 (1985)).
211 Id. at § 177 (current version at R.S.C. ch. C-46, § 181 (1985)).
212 Cohen Report, supra note 203, at 773.
213 Canadian Criminal Code § 281.2(1) (current version at R.S.C. ch. C-46, § 319.1 (1985)). The
statute reads:
Every one who, by communicating statements in any public place, incites hatred against
any identifiable group where such incitement is likely to lead to a breach of the peace, is guilty
of
(a) an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years;
or
(b) an offense punishable on summary conviction.
214 Cohen Report, supra note 203, at 773.
215 See Canadian Criminal Code § 281.2(2) (current version at R.S.C. ch. C-46, § 319.2 (1985)).
216 LAW REFORM, supra note 201, at 9. These include truth, good faith, and fair comment on a
public subject. Canadian Criminal Code § 281.2(2) (current version at R.S.C. ch. C-46, § 319(3)
(1985)).
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Attorney General's consent to prosecute 17 are designed to limit the like-
lihood of abuse. Although a few civil libertarians continue to express
concern, criticism generally has been muted.218 One commentator has
observed that when hate laws were first proposed, the Canadian Civil
Liberties Association raised the spectre of the slippery slope;219 yet, they
have been applied sparingly, and little discernible weakening of commit-
ment to free speech has occurred.220 As in Great Britain, the remaining
debate concerns how broad or narrow the rules should be, details of their
effectuation, and defenses to charges brought under them.
221
3. Other Countries.-As has been seen, anti-hate speech legislation
generally takes one of three forms: laws against group libel, breach of the
peace, and incitement to racial hatred. 222 States which have enacted in-
citement statutes have, for the most part, based their criminal codes on




The German penal code outlaws the spreading of hatred, promotion
of genocide, 227 inciting of hatred against minority groups in a manner
tending to breach the peace,228 organization of unconstitutional political
parties (neo-Nazi),229 and dissemination of propaganda 230 and use of the
emblems of these parties.231 It also prohibits writings that "incite to ra-
cial hatred or which depict cruel and otherwise inhumane acts of vio-
lence against persons in such a manner as to glorify or deny the
wrongfulness of such acts of violence. ' 232 Further, it is a punishable of-
fense to deny the Holocaust's existence.
233
Italy, which at the time of article 4's enactment expressed concern
217 Canadian Criminal Code § 319(6).
218 Matsuda, supra note 204, at 339 (citing R. v. Buzzanga and Durocher, 25 O.R.(2d) 705, 101
D.L.R. 3rd 488 (CA) (1979)).
219 Id. at 370-71.
220 Id. Most Canadians appear to support the law and even call for it to be made more effective.
Id.
221 Canadian Bar Association, Special Committee on Racial and Religious Hatred, HATRED AND
THE LAW (1984).
222 For a detailed analysis, see Kretzmer, supra note 145, at 494-507.
223 See supra notes 157-59 and accompanying text; Kretzmer, supra note 145, at 494-507.
224 Commentators have praised the Netherlands Code for the way it effectuates the country's
obligations under the U.N. Convention. N. LERNER, supra note 155, at 187.
225 Id. at 158.
226 J. INGLES, supra note 145, at 21.
227 THE PENAL CODE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY § 220(a) (Q. Darby Trans.
1987).
228 Id. § 130.
229 Id. § 84.
230 Id. § 86.
231 Id. § 86a.
232 Id. § 131.
233 LAW REFORM, supra note 201, at 22.
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that the article might jeopardize the right of free expression, nevertheless
enacted one of the strongest laws implementing it.234 The first sentence
under the law was imposed on October 28, 1980, after eleven Italian
youths carried wooden crosses and shouted "Jews to the ovens" and
"Hitler taught us it's no crime to kill Jews" during a basketball game
between Israel and Italy. The judge imposed a sentence of three years
and four months.
235
The Scandinavian countries have long protected individual liberty.
Yet, Sweden's constitution236 permits punishment of hate speech237 and
acts of persecution against national or ethnic-origin groups.238 Norway
recently amended its penal code in the wake of antisemitic violence. The
statute provides:
Anyone who threatens, insults, or exposes any person or groups of per-
sons to hatred, persecution or contempt on account of their religion, race,
colour, or national or ethnic origin by means of a public utterance or by
other means of communication brought before, or in any other way dissem-
inated among the general public, shall be punished by fines or imprison-
234 Kretzmer, supra note 145, at 499. The law reads:
Article 3
Save where the Act constitutes a more serious offence, for the purposes of implementation of the
provisions of Article 4 of the Convention, a penalty of imprisonment for a period from one to
four years shall be imposed on:
(a) Any person who, in any way whatsoever, disseminates ideas based on racial superiority or
racial hatred;
(b) Any person who, in any way whatsoever, instigates discrimination or inspires the commis-
sion of or commits, acts of violence or incitement to violence against persons because they
belong to a national, ethnic or racial group.
Act No. 654, Oct. 13, 1975, reprinted in Annex and the initial report of Italy (CERD /C/R.95/ add.
1).
235 Around the World; 11 Youths Sentenced in Italy for Anti-Semitic Acts, N.Y. Times, Oct. 29,
1980, at A5, col. 1.
236 Instrument of Government, reprinted in Vol. XVI Constitutions of the Countries of the World
(1985) [hereinafter Instrument of Government].
237 Swed. Penal Code ch. 16, § 8 (1972).
238 Instrument of Government, supra note 236, at ch. 2, art. 13. The Penal Code provides that:
If a person publicly or otherwise in a statement or other communication which is spread among
the public threatens or expresses contempt for an ethnic group or other such group with allu-
sion to race, skin color, national or ethnic origin or religious creed, he shall be sentenced for
agitation against ethnic group to imprisonment for at most two years, or, if the crime is petty, to
pay a fine.
Swed. Penal Code ch. 16, § 8 (1986) (emphasis in original).
Though this statute has been in place for more than 20 years, Sweden is generally considered a
free and tolerant society. Lasson, Group Libel Versus Free Speech: When Big Brother Should Butt
In, 23 DuQ. L. REv. 77, 89 (1984). One might argue, however, that conflict between speech and
equality values is minimized in Sweden by the infrequency with which prosecutions occur. See
Broadcaster Sentenced for Racism, Wis. St. J., Nov. 15, 1989, at 9A, col. 6 (prosecutions infrequent).
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ment up to two years. 239
Australia has adopted the Racial Discrimination Act of 1975,240
which makes it "unlawful for a person to publish or display... an adver-
tisement or notice that indicates... an intention to do an act that is
unlawful by reason of a provision of this Part. '241 New Zealand's Race
Relations Act of 1971, amended in 1977,242 makes incitement to racial
disharmony a criminal offense.243
4. Summary.-As previously noted, one must extrapolate cau-
tiously from the experiences of other societies. Moreover, what holds
true of a nation may not hold true for a university, whose peculiar inter-
ests may make anti-hate speech legislation either more or less defensible.
Still, it would be a mistake to ignore the experience of Canada, a nation
whose constitutional approach to regulation of speech resembles our
own; or that of Great Britain, with whom we share a long common-law
tradition. With these provisos, some cautious generalizations are possi-
ble. The acceptance and effectiveness of laws against hate speech depend
on a constellation of social and historical conditions. In Scandinavia, the
laws have remained untested and unchallenged. In Britain and Canada,
antiracism laws met with initial resistance, which has largely subsided.244
In these and other countries which have implemented anti-hate legisla-
tion, there appears to have been little of a snowball effect towards censor-
ship.245 Thus, it is evidently possible to regulate the more vicious forms
of race-hate speech, while remaining committed to free expression.2 46
239 In interpreting this statute, the Norwegian Supreme Court balances section 135(a) with the
right of freedom of speech. Id. Speech is protected but not absolute; the criminal law can sanction
its exercise when it becomes abusive. Reprinted in initial report (CERD/C/R,25/Add.3) amending
ch. 16 of the Penal Code. Finland ratified the Convention on July 14, 1970 and inserted article 6
into its penal code. It states:
a) anyone disseminating to the public statements and other information in which a section of
the population is threatened, slandered or insulted on account of being of a certain race, colour,
national or ethnic origin or confession of faith shall be sentenced for discrimination against that
section of the people to imprisonment for two years at most or to pay a fine.
Id. at art. 6(a).
240 Racial Discrimination Act of 1975, reprinted in Acts of the Parliament of the Commonwealth
349 (1975).
241 Id. at 355.
242 New Zealand Race Relations Act of 1971, no. 150, reprinted in 4 N.Z. Stats. 3590 (1971).
The 1977 amendments made wording changes and increased the fines. The amendments did not
affect the substance of the law. 4 N.Z. Stats. at 3590 (1977).
243 This includes the publication or distribution of written or spoken material likely to incite
hostility or ill will against any group. Id.
244 In most, the debate is now focused not so much on whether these laws interfere with free
expression, as whether they are effective and broad enough. Matsuda, supra note 25, at 2341-48.
245 Kretzmer, supra note 145, at 474 n.117.
246 Minow, supra note 125; see also L. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY 38 (1985) ("United
States stands virtually alone in the degree to which it has decided legally to tolerate racist rhetoric");
Bernstein, supra note 2 (observing that "[s]ome countries regarded as free and democratic-France
and Canada among them-have strong laws against uttering racist or religious invective").
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IV. SOCIAL SCIENCE AND RACISM
The debate surrounding campus antiracism rules has not only pro-
ceeded in an empirical vacuum, ignoring the experience of other coun-
tries; it has also proceeded in a theoretical one, blind to the insights of
social scientists who have studied race and racism. Critics of antiracism
rules, for example, often assert: (i) that rules forbidding racist remarks
will simply cause racism to go underground or surface in a more virulent
form;2 4 7 (ii) that racist speech serves as a pressure valve, allowing
prejudiced individuals to blow off steam harmlessly; 248 (ii) that punish-
ing racist speech is ineffective because it does not deal with the "root"
causes of racism; 249 and (iv) that the harm of a racial insult is de
minimis.250 For their part, defenders of anti-hate rules maintain that ra-
cial speech causes serious harm to the psyche and educational prospects
of its victims, with little if any documentation of these effects. Social
science research sheds light on these and other assertions central to the
debate about antiracism rules. This Part first reviews theories of the na-
ture and origin of racial prejudice. It then examines social science writ-
ing on how racist behavior may best be controlled.
A. Nature and Origin of Prejudice
Social scientists have put forward a number of overlapping theo-
ries-psychodynamic, socioeconomic, and social-psychological-that ex-
plain how persons come to harbor prejudiced attitudes toward members
of outgroups. There is no dominant theory; indeed, more than one ap-
proach may be essential to understand the complex phenomenon of
racism.
Psychodynamic theories find the source of racism in personality
traits of particular individuals. 251 For example, Adorno and his coau-
thors write that the most severe forms of racism are associated with a
group of traits labelled the "authoritarian personality. s25 2 Authoritarian
personalities are rigid, conventional, and have difficulty accepting im-
pulses they consider deviant-fear, weakness, sex, and aggression. Be-
cause they reject these impulses in themselves, they are prone to displace
247 N. Strossen, Remarks at ACLU Biennial Conference Plenary session, Racism on the Rise
(June 15, 1989), at 8 (on file with author).
248 Delgado, supra note 23, at 178-79 (discussing this view).
249 N. Strossen, supra note 247, at 3, 7, 9; see also O'Neil, supra note 10 (educational options,
unlike student conduct rules, will get at the root causes of the problem of campus racism).
250 N. Strossen, supra note 247, at 4-8 (misallocation of resources to combat racist speech).
251 These theories came into focus particularly after World War II as the world strove to under-
stand the horror of the Holocaust. See, eg., B. BETTELHEIM & M. JANOwrrz, DYNAMICS OF PREJ-
UDICE (1950); E. HARTLEY, PROBLEMS IN PREJUDICE (1948); Lawrence, The Id, The Ego and
Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317 (1986).
252 T. ADORNO, E. FRENKEL-BRUNSWICK, D. LEVINSON & R. SANFORD, THE AUTHORITA-
RIAN PERSONALITY (1969).
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them onto others, particularly members of disempowered groups."' 3
Other social scientists believe that understanding racism requires go-
ing beyond personal pathology to broader currents in society.254 Many
hold that two principal sources of racism and prejudice toward out-
groups are economic dislocation and competition with the dominant
group.255 The anxiety produced by rapid social change requires a scape-
goat-but that group must then be assigned traits of inferiority, in order
to preserve the myth that America is fair and just.256 Scapegoating also
channels aggression and strengthens group loyalty against outsiders who
are perceived as at fault for societal ills.
257
Finally, the social-psychological approach258 holds that racial antip-
athies are not innate but are learned,259 often as an aspect of group mem-
bership. 260 Humans have a natural propensity to generalize. Ethnic
categories serve this purpose, as well as satisfy the basic human need for
group identity.261 Loyalties to the in-group are accompanied by dislike
of outgroups. The dislike increases the distance between the individual
and the outgroup, so that the attitude becomes self-reinforcing.262
The combined effect of all these forces-personal dynamics,
253 G. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 400-03, 482 (25th Anniversary ed. 1979)
(authoritarians often received rigid discipline by parents when young and were given conditional
affection based on clearly defined roles of parental dominance and child submission; thus they learn
to repress any feelings objectionable to parents and to project them onto others); Harding, Prosban-
sky, Kutner & Chein, Prejudice and Ethnic Relations, in 5 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 1,
33-35 (G. Lindzey & E. Aronson eds. 1968).
254 J. KOVEL, WHITE RACISM-A PSYCHOHISTORY 231 (1984); Handlin, Prejudice and Capital-
ist Exploitation, in 6 COMMENTARY 79 (1948); see also G. ALLPORT, supra note 253, at 208-11, 224-
25.
255 Eg., BETTELHEIM & JANOwrrz, supra note 251 (ethnic prejudice increases in times of eco-
nomic depression); Handlin, supra note 254; J. KovEL, supra note 254, at 231; Delgado, The Impe-
rial Scholar, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 561, 570-71 (1984).
256 G. ALLPORT, supra note 253, at 224; I. KATZ, STIGMA-A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALY-
sis 121 (1981).
257 G. ALLPORT, supra note 253, at 234-38; I. KATz, supra note 256, at 221; C. KLUCKHOLM,
NAVAHO WITCHCRAFT (1944). Compare these scapegoating theorists with those of the closely re-
lated "internal colonialism" school, eg., 0. Cox, CASTE, CLASS AND RACE: A STUDY IN SOCIAL
DYNAMICS (1948); Cho, Theories of Racial Inequality: From Assimilation to Internal Colonialism,
reprinted in RACE, CLASS, CULTURE IN AMERICA: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES OF THIRD WORLD
AMERICA 245 (L. Shinagawa ed. 1983) and those who advocate the "frustration-aggression" ap-
proach to understanding prejudice. Eg., D. BETHLEHEM, A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF RACE 100.01
(1985); G. SIMPSON & J. YINGER, RACIAL AND CULTURAL MINORIrIES: AN ANALYSIS OF PREJU-
DICE AND DISCRIMINATION 68 (4th ed. 1972).
258 See, e.g., G. ALLPORT, supra note 253, at 206; G. SIMPSON & J. YINGER, supra note 257, at
139; see also M. GOODMAN, RACE AWARENESS IN YOUNG CHILDREN 250-51 (1964).
259 K. CLARK, PREJUDICE AND YOUR CHILD 17 (2d ed. 1963); see also M. GOODMAN, supra
note 258.
260 Eg., G. ALLPORT, supra note 253, at 20, 21-35, 37.
261 Id. at 20, 37; Taifel, Cognitive Aspects of Prejudice, 25 J. Soc. IssUEs 79-97 (1969).
262 G. ALLPORT, supra note 253, at 29, 39-41, 78; M. SHERIF & C. SHERIF, GROUPS IN HAR-
MONY AND TENSION 218 (1966).
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scapegoating, economic dislocations, and ingroup-outgroup categories-
is powerful: studies indicate that a majority of Americans harbor some
prejudice toward groups other than their own.263 Yet, not all act on
these attitudes; at times, we hold our prejudice in check. The next sub-
part explores the conditions under which the racial impulse is restrained
and what society may do to promote restraint.
B. Controlling Racism
Unlike with racism's etiology, there is relative agreement on the part
of social scientists on how to control its expression. Much prejudice is
situational-individuals express it because the environment encourages
or tolerates it.264 The attitude may be relatively constant, but most of us
express it selectively-at times we hold it in check, at other times we feel
freer to express it in action.265 The main inhibiter of prejudice is the
certainty that it will be remarked and punished. This "confrontation the-
ory" 266 for controlling racism holds that most individuals are ambivalent
in matters of race. We realize that the national values-those enshrined
in the "American Creed"-call for fair and respectful treatment of all.
But the fair-mindedness of our public norms is not always matched by
our private behavior. 267 During moments of intimacy we feel much freer
to tell or laugh at an ethnic joke, to make a racist or sexist remark.
268
Rules, formalities, and other environmental reminders put us on no-
tice that the occasion requires the higher formal values of our culture.
The existence of rules forbidding certain types of racist acts causes us not
to be inclined to carry them out. Moreover, threat of public notice and
disapproval operates as a reinforcer-the potential racist refrains from
acting, out of fear of notice and sanction. The confrontation theory is
probably today the majority view among social scientists on how to con-
trol racism. Most who subscribe to this approach hold that laws and
rules play a vital role in controlling racism. According to Allport, they
"create a public conscience and a standard for expected behavior that
check overt signs of prejudice. ' 269 Nor is the change merely cosmetic. In
time, rules are internalized, and the impulse to engage in racist behavior
weakens.270
263 G. ALLPORT, supra note 253, at 79-80.
264 Id. at 337-38; P. VAN DEN BERGHE, RACE AND RACISM 20-21 (2d ed. 1978).
265 See I. KATz, supra note 256, at 23-24; J. KOVEL, supra note 254, at 54-55.
266 On the confrontation theory, see generally I. KATZ, supra note 256, at 16, 109; Westie, The
American Dilemma: An Empirical Test, 30 AM. Soc. REv. 527, 529 (1965).
267 G. MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA (1962).
268 Id.; see also Allport, Prejudice" Is it Societal or Personal?, in RACIAL ATrTrUDES IN
AMERICA: ANALYSES AND FINDINGS OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 165, 166 (J. Brigham & T. Weiss-
bach eds. 1971).
269 G. ALLPORT, supra note 253, at 470-71 (emphasis in original).
270 Id.; Westie, supra note 267, at 529, 533; see also Katz & Gurin, Race Relations and the Social
Sciences" Overview and Further Discussion, in RACE AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 342, 373 (I. Katz &
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The current understanding of racial prejudice thus lends some sup-
port to campus antiracism rules. The mere existence of such rules will
often cause members of the campus community to behave in a more egal-
itarian way, particularly when others may be watching. Even in private
settings, some people will refrain from acting because the law has set an
example. Those whose prejudice is associated with authoritarianism will
do so because the rules represent society's legitimate voice.
Further, social science casts doubt on both the "hydraulic" theory
of racism, according to which controlling racism in one arena will simply
cause it to crop up somewhere else,271 and the theory that racist remarks
are relatively harmless. A large body of literature shows that incessant
racial categorization and treatment seriously impair the prospects and
development of persons of minority race,272 deepen rigidity and set the




As mentioned earlier, campus antiracism rules can be analyzed from
two directions. One perspective puts speech at the center, and demands
that proponents of antiracism rules justify the abridgment of that lib-
erty.274 Another perspective puts equal dignity at the center, and regards
the speech-act as a violation.275 Proponents of the latter view argue that
the university has the power (perhaps the duty) to protect vulnerable
P. Gurin eds. 1969). A competitor theory, the "social contact" theory, formed the basis of institu-
tional desegregation in the 1960s and 1970s, but has been largely supplanted by the confrontation
theory. For a discussion of the social contact approach, see, eg., Amir, Contact Hypothesis in Ethnic
Relations, 71 PSYCHOLOGY BULL. 319 (1969). For a discussion of the steps of attitude transforma-
tion, see H. KELMAN, COMPLIANCE IDENTIFICATION AND INTERNALIZATION: THREE PROCESSES
OF ATITUDE CHANGE 51-68 (1958) (change will occur if the individuals responsible for creating
and enforcing the rule have high respect and trust, and are seen as acting fairly).
271 See sources cited insupra notes 269-70 (impulse withers if not acted on); Berkowitz, The Case
for Bottling Up Rage, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, July 1973, at 26.
272 See Delgado, supra note 23, at 136-49 (harms of racism and racist speech include: impairment
of the ideal of equal respect; injury to the victim's feelings, self-worth, physical and mental well-
being, and pecuniary prospects; and, especially in the case of children, damage to identity and self-
regard); Brown, supra note 2, at 323-25 (same); see also G. ALLPORT, supra note 253, at 142-61
(passivity, self-hate, militancy, extreme alerting, aggression against one group, enhanced striving,
clowning, cloistering, and strengthening of in-group ties); M. GOODMAN, supra note 258 (detailing
special vulnerability of children to racial abuse and categorization); Lawrence, supra note 20, at 15
n.29 (harms include dehumanization) & 23 n.46 (psychic injury, displaced aggression, suicide, fear,
self-hate, clowning, and self-defeating behavior); Matsuda, supra note 25, at 2335-41 (harmful effects
of racist messages on victim, most of which are internalized and delayed, are not of an immediate,
reactive nature); Goleman, Anger Over Racism is Seen as a Cause of Blacks' High Blood Pressure,
N.Y. Times, Apr. 24, 1990, at C3, col. 1.
273 Delgado, supra note 23, at 140 (harms to the perpetrator); G. ALLPORT, supra note 253, at
170-86, 371-84, 407-08; G. SIMPSON & J. YINGER, supra note 257, at 238.
274 See supra notes 6-10 and accompanying text.
275 See supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text.
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populations from racial abuse, and demand that the advocates of free
speech show why the interest in hurling invective should nevertheless
prevail. Typically, they cite some of the harms associated with racist
speech detailed in the preceding section. This Part analyzes both views:
subpart A evaluates the free-speech claim, subpart B the equality
arguments.
A. A First Amendment View
The first amendment appears to stand as a formidable barrier to
campus rules prohibiting group-disparaging speech. Designed to assure
that debate on public issues is "uninhibited, robust, and wide open,
'276
the first amendment protects speech which we hate as much as that
which we hold dear.277 Yet, racial insults implicate powerful social inter-
ests in equality and equal personhood.278 When uttered on university
campuses, racial insults bring into play additional concerns. Few would
question that the university has strong, legitimate interests in (i) teach-
ing students and teachers to treat each other respectfully; (ii) protecting
minority-group students from harassment; and (iii) protecting diversity,
which could be impaired if students of color become demoralized and
leave the university, or if parents of minority race decide to send their
children elsewhere.2 7
9
The United States Supreme Court has only on one occasion weighed
free speech against the equal-protection values endangered by race-hate
speech. In Beauharnais v. Illinois, z 0 the defendant was convicted under
a statute prohibiting dissemination of materials promoting racial or reli-
gious hatred. Justice Frankfurter, citing the "fighting words" doctrine of
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, ruled that libelous statements aimed at
groups, like those aimed at individuals, fall outside first amendment pro-
tection.28 1 Later decisions, notably New York Times v. Sullivan,282 have
276 New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
277 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919).
278 Delgado, supra note 23, at 140-45; see also Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601,
1609 (1986) ("The judges deal in pain and death"); Ross, The Richmond Narratives, 68 TEx. L.
REv. 381, 389 (1989) (implying that the first amendment narrative may be "violent," in the sense
that Robert Cover uses that term).
279 See Tatel, supra note 2; Statement by Regent Erroll B. Davis, Jr., supra note 12 (mentioning
each of these concerns); see also Evenson, On Outlawing Hate Speech, GUILD NOTES, Nov./Dec.
1989, at 9 (campus hate speech interferes with learning); Shaw, Racism Policy Will Meet Tests, Wis.
St. J., July 10, 1989, at 18A, col. 1 (university has interest in teaching tolerance, and in encouraging
students of color to remain); Campus Racism, Michigan Plans to Combat Bias, Wis. St. J., Dec. 12,
1989, at 3A, col. 4 (University of Michigan president cites need to respond to racial unrest because of
United State's increasing ethnic diversity and necessity of inculcating norms of tolerance).
280 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
281 Id. at 257-58.
282 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (libel of public figures requires showing of actual malice); see also Garri-
son v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964) (overturning libel judgment won by public official by analogiz-
ing case to seditious libel).
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increased protection for libelous speech, with the result that some com-
mentators and courts have questioned whether Beauharnais today would
be decided differently. 2 3 Yet, Beauharnais has never been overruled,
and in the meantime many courts have afforded redress in tort for ra-
cially or sexually insulting language, with few finding any constitutional
problem with doing So. 2 8 4
Moreover, over the past century the courts have carved out or toler-
ated dozens of "exceptions" to free speech. These exceptions include:
speech used to form a criminal conspiracy285 or an ordinary contract;
28 6
speech that disseminates an official secret;28 7 speech that defames or i-
bels someone;288 speech that is obscene;289 speech that creates a hostile
workplace;290 speech that violates a trademark or plagiarizes another's
words;291 speech that creates an immediately harmful impact or is tanta-
mount to shouting fire in a crowded theatre;292 "patently offensive"
speech directed at captive audiences or broadcast on the airwaves;
293
speech that constitutes "fighting words";294 speech that disrespects a
judge, teacher, military officer, or other authority figure;295 speech used
to defraud a consumer;296 words used to fix prices;297 words ("stick 'em
up-hand over the money") used to communicate a criminal threat;
298
and untruthful or irrelevant speech given under oath or during a trial.299
283 See, eg., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 861 n.2 (1988) (citing Smith v. Collin,
439 U.S. 916, 919 (1978) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)).
284 These cases are collected and discussed in Delgado, supra note 23.
285 See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
286 Contract law penalizes, by attaching various penalties and consequences to them, words of
offer and acceptance (such as, "You've got a deal").
287 Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1988) (per curiam); United States v. Progressive, Inc.,
467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979); see also L. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOcIETY 176 (1986)
(disclosure of secrets in wartime setting not protected speech).
288 Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952); see Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979);
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974).
289 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); see Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
290 Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 106 S. Ct. 2399 (1988); Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir.
1971).
291 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985); Zacchini v.
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
292 Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
293 Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726
(1978).
294 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
295 Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 402 (1918); see Bethel School Dist. v. Fra-
ser, 106 S. Ct. 3159 (1988). For federal protection of inanimate objects and symbols, see 18 U.S.C.
§ 707 (4-H club symbol); 18 U.S.C. § 711 (Smokey the Bear); 18 U.S.C. § 711a (Woodsey the owl);
36 U.S.C. §§ 170 et seq. (U.S. flag).
296 On fraud, see R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 304-08, 1048 (3d ed. 1982).
297 On punishment of price-fixing, see L. SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST 29-30, 132-34 (1977).
298 On the various crimes of threat, see R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE supra note 296, at 177-82, 448-
52, 1113-15.
299 See, e.g., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 544-48 (E. Cleary ed. 1984). The Court uses a number
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Much speech, then, is unprotected. 3°° The issues are whether the
social interest in reining in racially offensive speech is as great as that
which gives rise to these "exceptional" categories, and whether the use of
racially offensive language has speech value.301 Because no recent
Supreme Court decision directly addresses these issues, one might look to
the underlying policies of our system of free expression to understand
how the Supreme Court may rule if an appropriate case comes before
it.302
Our system of free expression serves a number of societal and indi-
of analytical routes to arrive at the conclusion that certain types of speech should be considered
exceptions to first amendment protection. Some correspond to Justice Holmes's "clear and present
danger" test, according to which "words... used in such circumstances and... of such a nature as
to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has
a right to prevent." Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919); Abrams v. United States, 250
U.S. 616, 628 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); see also Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951)
(modifying test to take account of gravity of evil and degree of probability).
At other times, the Supreme Court has applied a two-tier approach, according to which "well-
defined and narrowly limited classes of speech" are held to fall outside first amendment protection.
See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1948). Examples of such exceptions are obscenity,
defamation, and child pornography. In either case, the Court weighs the societal interest sought to
be protected against the value of the speech within our system of free expression. See id. at 572 ("the
ideas ... are of such slight social value ... that any benefit... is clearly outweighed by the social
interest in order and morality."). Exceptions are not lightly created--even emotional speech, con-
veying little informational content, is protected. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (swear
words printed on jacket protected as form of expression); see also Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518
(1972) (conviction of antiwar protester who shouted, "White son of a bitch, I'll kill you," to police
officer at Army induction station under breach of peace statute reversed as overbroad).
In general, the Court has rejected efforts to restrict speech that are based on "sensibility"
harms. See Rosenfeld v. New York, 408 U.S. 901 (1972) (speaker repeatedly said "motherfucking"
in speech before school board meeting). Yet, recent commentary and the approach suggested in this
subpart urge that the injury of racially disparaging speech goes beyond sensibility harms. See infra
notes 313-18 and accompanying text; Note, supra note 134. Recently, the Court used Chaplinsky's
"speech of slight social value" standard to coin a new exception for child pornography. New York v.
Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982). For an analysis of the Court's current approach to uncovered speech
and further discussion of Ferber, see Schauer, Codifying the FirstAmendment" New York v. Ferber,
1982 Sup. CT. REv. 285, 303.
For a concise discussion of many of the "exceptions" and excluded "categories" of speech, see J.
NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTrrTIONAL LAW 865-67, 879, 905, 909, 911, 915, 923,
943-52, 960-73, 973-88, 998-1000, 1009-27 (2d ed. 1983). For a discussion of various models for
understanding the Court's approach to the scope of first amendment protection, see Baker, Scope of
First Amendment Freedom ofSpeech, 25 UCLA L. REv. 964 (1978).
300 L. TRIBE, supra note 283, at 932 ("an edifice of less than complete protection").
301 The exceptional categories in most cases mark an area where the socially and economically
powerful need an exception. Few exceptions benefit the weak and powerless. Is insistence on apply-
ing absolutism to the problem of racist speech itself class-based and racist? Cf. N. ROSENBERG,
PROTECTING THE BEST MEN (1986) (arguing that law of defamation was intended to protect power-
ful white males).
302 K. GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE 295 & n.33 (1989)
(Supreme Court could broaden permissible bases for prohibition; precise issue of racist speech has
not been settled).
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vidual goals. 303 Included are the personal fulfillment of the speaker; as-
certainment of the truth; participation in democratic decisionmaking;
and achieving a balance between social stability and change. Applying
these policies to the controversy surrounding campus antiracism rules
yields no clear result. Uttering racial slurs may afford the racially trou-
bled speaker some immediate relief, but hardly seems essential to self-
fulfillment in any ideal sense. Indeed, social science writers hold that
making racist remarks impairs, rather than promotes, the growth of the
person who makes them, by encouraging rigid, dichotomous thinking
and impeding moral development. 304 Moreover, such remarks serve lit-
tle dialogic purpose; they do not seek to connect the speaker and ad-
dressee in a community of shared ideals.30 5 They divide, rather than
unite.
Additionally, slurs contribute little to the discovery of truth. Class-
room discussion of racial matters and even the speech of a bigot aimed at
proving the superiority of the white race might move us closer to the
truth.30 6 But one-on-one insults do not. They neither state nor attack a
proposition; they are like a slap in the face.30 7 By the same token, racial
insults do little to help reach broad social consensuses. Indeed, by de-
moralizing their victim they may actually reduce speech, dialogue, and
participation in political life.30 8 "More speech" is rarely a solution. Epi-
thets often strike suddenly, immobilizing their victim and rendering her
speechless. 30 9 Often they are delivered in cowardly, anonymous fash-
ion-for example, in the form of a defaced poster or leaflet slipped under
a student's door,310 or hurled by a group against a single victim, render-
ing response foolhardy.311 Nor do they help strike a healthy balance be-
tween stability and social change. Racial epithets could be argued to
303 Commentators have categorized these goals differently. The following are those proposed in
T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF ExPRESSION 3-6 (1970), and Emerson, Toward A Gen-
eral Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 878-86 (1963). For other treatments, see
Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FouND. RES. J. 521; Bork,
Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971); Meiklejohn, The
First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. Cr. REv. 245; Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U.
PA. L. REv. 591 (1982).
304 Eg., G. ALLPORT, supra note 253, at 170-86, 371-84, 407-08.
305 Delgado, supra note 23, at 140-43; Lawrence, supra note 20, at 5; see Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at
572 (words that "by their very utterance inflict injury" are punishable).
306 Most university statutes and guidelines appear to exclude this type of speech.
307 See Delgado, supra note 23, at 136, 143-45, 147-48; see also K. GREENAWALT, supra note
302, at 289-99.
308 Delgado, supra note 23, at 144-46.
309 See L. TRIBE, supra note 283, at 837; Lawrence, supra note 20, at 14, Wesson, Sex, Lies and
Videotape: The Pornographer As Censor (forthcoming 1990).
310 See, e.g., supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
311 See, eg., supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text. Moreover, the places of perpetrator and
victim are not parallel. "Talking back" to a white who has insulted, say, a person of color, is not
easily feasible, since nothing has the same emotional currency as a racial epithet like, "Go home,
Nigger, you don't belong on this campus." What word has the impact of Nigger-you white?
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relieve racial tension harmlessly and thus contribute to racial stability,
but this strained argument has been called into question by social
science.
3 12
Yet racial epithets are speech, and as such we ought to protect them
unless there is a very good reason for not doing so. A recent book by
Kent Greenawalt suggests a framework for assessing laws against in-
sults. 313 Drawing on first amendment principles and case law, Greena-
walt writes that the setting, the speaker's intention, the forum's interest,
and the relationship between the speaker and the victim must be consid-
ered.314 Moreover, abusive words (like kike, nigger, wop, and faggot) are
punishable if spoken with intent, cause a harm subject to formulation in
clear legal language, and form a message essentially devoid of ideas. 315
Greenawalt offers as an example of words that could be criminally pun-
ishable, "You Spick whore" uttered by four men to a woman of color at a
bus stop, intended to humiliate her.3 16 He notes that such words can
have long-term damaging effects on the victim3 17 and have little if any
cognitive content; that which the words have may be expressed in other
ways.
3 18
Under Greenawalt's test, narrowly drawn university guidelines pe-
nalizing racial slurs might withstand scrutiny. The university forum has
a strong interest in establishing a nonracist atmosphere. Moreover, most
university rules are aimed at face-to-face remarks that are intentionally
abusive. Most exclude classroom speech, speeches to a crowd, and satire
published in a campus newspaper. Under Greenawalt's nonabsolutist ap-
proach, such rules might well be held constitutional.
31 9
312 See supra notes 248, 303-05 and accompanying text.
313 K. GREENAWALT, supra note 302; see also Greenawalt, Insults and Epithets:. Are They Pro-
tected Speech?, 42 RUTGERS L. REv. 287 (1990) (putting forth similar argument, drawn from his
book).
314 Greenawalt, supra note 313, at 289.
315 Id. at 291-93, 295-301.
316 Id. at 299.
317 Id.
318 Id.
319 Universities might decline to enact such rules even if it were constitutional to do so. See
Address by Delgado, State Historical Society, Madison, Wis., Apr. 24, 1989, cited in Lawrence,
supra note 20, at 29:
I believe that racist speech benefits powerful white-dominated institutions. The highly edu-
cated, refined persons who operate the University of Wisconsin, other universities, and major
corporations, would never, ever themselves utter a racial slur. That is the last thing they would
do.
Yet, they benefit, and on a subconscious level they know they benefit, from a certain
amount of low-grade racism in the environment. If an occasional bigot or redneck calls one of
us a nigger or spick one night late as we're on our way home from the library, that is all to the
good. Please understand that I am not talking about the very heavy stuff-violence, beatings,
bones in the nose. That brings out the TV cameras and the press and gives the university a
black eye. I mean the daily, low-grade largely invisible stuff, the hassling, cruel remarks, and
other things that would be covered by rules. This kind of behavior keeps nonwhite people on
edge, a little off balance. We get these occasional reminders that we are different, and not really
wanted. It prevents us from digging in too strongly, starting to think we could really belong
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B. An Equal Protection View
The first amendment perspective yields no clear-cut result. Society
has a strong interest in seeing that expression is as unfettered as possible,
yet the kind of expression under consideration has no great social worth
and can cause serious harm. Unfortunately, looking at the problem of
racist speech from the perspective of the equality-protecting amendments
yields no clearer result.
Equality and equal respect are highly valued principles in our sys-
tem of jurisprudence. Three constitutional provisions320 and a myriad of
federal and state statutes are aimed at protecting the rights of racial, reli-
gious, and sexual minorities to be free from discrimination in housing,
education, jobs, and many other areas of life.321 Moreover, universities
have considerable power to enact regulations protecting minority inter-
ests. 322 Yet the equality principle is not without limits. State agencies
may not redress breaches by means that too broadly encroach on the
here. It makes us a little introspective, a little unsure of ourselves; at the right low-grade level it
prevents us from organizing on behalf of more important things. It assures that those of us of
real spirit, real pride, just plain leave-all of which is quite a substantial benefit for the institu-
tion.
(citing S. BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL (1979) (rape is the crime of all men against all
women; even men who would not consider assaulting a woman nevertheless benefit from in terrorem
effect fear of rape inspires in women)).
320 U.S. CONST. amends. XUII-XV.
321 See, e.g., D. BELL, supra note 21 (discussing such statutes and their history). Most campus
antiracism rules invoke these principles in their preambles or legislative histories. E.g., Campbell,
supra note 1 (University of Texas rule); Statement by Regent Erroll B. Davis, Jr., supra note 12
(University of Wisconsin rule).
The thirteenth and fourteenth amendments, together with their legislative effectuations, particu-
larly 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-82, secure the rights of liberty, personal security and property of the former
slaves and their descendants. See J. TEN BROEK, EQUAL UNDER THE LAW (1965); Reed, Section
1981 and Private Groups: The Right to Discriminate Versus Freedom From Discrimination, 84 YALE
L.J. 1441, 1445-48 (1975). Education is a liberty falling within federal protection, see Lau v. Nich-
ols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974), and rules against racial insult can be seen as aimed at eliminating "badges
and incidents of slavery." See Runyon v. MeCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (federal antidiscrimination
provisions reach private action; are permissible efforts to abolish aftereffects of slavery); Jones v.
Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
Federal law, then, probably gives universities the power (perhaps the obligation) to regulate
racial slurs. Often, they will have this power under state law as well. See, eg., WIs. CONST. art. I,
§ 11 (protecting right of people to be secure in their persons); State ex rel Jones v. Gerhardstein, 135
Wis. 2d 161, 400 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Wis. App. 1986) (art. I, § 11 gives rise to right of privacy that
includes "individual's right to be free from unwanted and unwarranted personal contact") (emphasis
added); see also Commonwealth v. Local Union 542, 347 F. Supp. 268, 299 (E.D. Pa. 1972) ("racist
acts are as related to the incidents of slavery as each roar of the ocean is related to each incoming
wave"; state action to eliminate discrimination permissible and supported by a compelling state in-
terest). For discussion of the limits of universities' power to effectuate equality, see infra notes 322-
29 and accompanying text.
322 See, eg., Soglin v. Kauffman, 418 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1969) (upholding suspensions of disrup-
tive students if such action is taken pursuant to reasonable and narrowly drawn rules); Henkel v.
Phillips, 82 Wis. 2d 27, 33-34, 260 N.W.2d 653 (1977); M. OLivAs, HIGHER EDUCATION LAW
(1989).
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rights of whites, or on other constitutional principles. Rigorous rules of
intent, causation, standing, and limiting relief circumscribe what may be
done.323 New causes of action are not lightly recognized; for example,
the legal system has resisted efforts by feminists to have pornography
deemed a civil rights offense against women.3 24
Moreover, courts have held or implied that a university's power to
effectuate campus policies, presumably including equality, is also limited.
Cases stemming from efforts to regulate the wearing of armbands, 325
what students may publish in the school newspaper, 326 or their freedom
to gather in open areas for worship or speech327 have shown that individ-
ual liberty will sometimes subordinate an institution's interest in achiev-
ing its educational objectives-students do not abandon all their
constitutional rights at the schoolhouse door.328 According to the author
of a leading treatise on higher education law, rules bridling racist speech
will be found constitutional if there is a local history of racial disruption;
if the rules are narrowly tailored to punish only face-to-face insults and
avoid encroaching on classroom and other protected speech; if they are
consistently and even-handedly applied; and if due process protections
such as the right to representation and a fair hearing are present.329 The
author's guidelines seem plausible, but have yet to be tested. One set of
rules was promulgated, then withdrawn; 330 another was declared over-
broad and subsequently redrafted. 331 In several jurisdictions, the ACLU
has announced that it is monitoring developments and may file suit.332
323 See Delgado, Derrick Bell and the Ideology of Racial Reform: Will We Ever Be Saved?, 97
YALE L.J. 923, 936 (1988) (summarizing these and other constraints).
324 See American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 475 U.S.
1001 (1986); C. MAcKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 175-95 (1987); MacKinnon, Not a Moral
Issue, 2 YALE L. & POL. J. 321 (1984); Wesson, supra note 305.
325 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
326 See Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 272 (1988) (Court weighed school officials' inter-
est in protecting those that could be harmed by article in school newspaper against paper's first
amendment right to publish what it wishes; upheld power to censor when "expression ... will
substantially interfere with the work of the school or impinge upon the rights of other students").
327 Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 270 n.4 (1981).
328 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506; see Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1974).
329 Interview with Michael Olivas, professor of law, U. Houston, Madison, WI (Feb. 4, 1990).
Universities must also avoid applying regulations only in racially charged and highly polarized situa-
tions. Id. Olivas is Director, Institute of Higher Education Law & Governance, and author of a
leading casebook on higher education law. See M. OLIVAS, supra note 322.
330 See Wilson, supra note 121 (Tufts University enacted, then rescinded rule); see also Tufts
Restores Free Speech After T-Shirt Confrontation, San Francisco Chron., Dec. 9, 1989, at B6, col. 1.
331 See supra notes 78-90 and accompanying text (events at University of Michigan).
332 Id. (events at University of Wisconsin); Cain, Policy Would Suspend Those Using Racial Slurs,
Colorado Daily, Jan. 30, 1990, at 1, col. 3. An ACLU spokesman said a Colorado rule being drafted
is sound "as long as... clearly defined.... the government has to do some protecting"); Blum &
Lobaco, Fighting Words at the ACLU, CAL. LAw., Feb. 1990, at 43 (ACLU has taken 20 cases
challenging student conduct codes); Shapiro, UC's Doctrine of Silence, The Recorder, Oct. 2, 1989,
at 1, col. 2 (Northern California ACLU monitoring events at Berkeley, may sue).
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In the meantime, analogous authority continues to develop. In Bob
Jones University v. United States,333 the Supreme Court held that univer-
sities may not discriminate in the name of religion. In University of
Pennsylvania v. EEOC,334 the Supreme Court held that a university's de-
sire to protect confidential tenure files did not insulate the university
from review in connection with discrimination investigations. Both cases
imply that the antidiscrimination imperative will at times prevail over
other strong interests, such as freedom of religion or academic freedom-
and possibly speech.
335
VI. RECONCILING THE FIRST AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS:
STIGMA-PICTURES AND THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF
REALITY
A. Class Subordination and the Problem of Concerted Speech
As the analysis to this point has shown, neither the constitutional
narrative of the first, nor of the thirteenth and fourteenth, amendments
clearly prevails in connection with campus antiracism rules. Judges must
choose. The dilemma is embedded in the nature of our system of law and
polities: we want and fear both equality and liberty.336 This Part offers a
solution to the problem of campus antiracism rules based on a post-
modem insight: the speech by which society "constructs" a stigma pic-
ture of minorities may be regulated consistently with the first amend-
ment. 337 Indeed, regulation may be necessary for full effectuation of the
values of equal personhood we hold equally dear.
The first step is recognizing that racism is, in almost all its aspects, a
class harm-the essence of which is subordination of one people by an-
other. The mechanism of this subordination is a complex, interlocking
series of acts, some physical, some symbolic. Although the physical acts
(like lynchings and cross burnings) are often the most striking, the sym-
333 Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (government's "overriding interest in
eradicating racial discrimination in education" outweighs institution's free exercise claim to a tax
exemption); see Laycock, Tax Exemption for Religiously Discriminatory Schools, 60 TEx. L. REv.
759 (1987).
334 University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 110 S. Ct. 577 (1990) (action brought on behalf of an
Asian woman denied tenure, in part, because her writings focused on Asian issues).
335 See also Marzette v. McPhee, 294 F. Supp. 562, 563, 569 (E.D. Wis. 1968) (students invaded
university president's office and made "insulting, degrading and humiliating" remarks; court held
such conduct subject to sanction).
336 See Delgado, Critical Legal Studies and the Realities of Race" Does the Fundamental Contra-
diction Have a Corollary?, 23 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407 (1988).
337 See supra note 16 (modem legal theory beginning to accept idea that narratives and stories
mediate and create reality; defining "postmodernism"). For the view that most knowledge is essen-
tially contestable, see T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1970); M. Po-
LANYI, PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE (1964). For the view that much legal knowledge should be
contested (but rarely is), see K. BUMILLER, THE CIVIL RIGHTS SOCIETY: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUC-
TION OF VICTIMS (1988); Delgado, supra note 16; Minow, supra note 16.
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bolic acts are the most insidious. By communicating and "constructing"
a shared cultural image of the victim group as inferior,338 we enable our-
selves to feel comfortable about the disparity in power and resources be-
tween ourselves and the stigmatized group.3 39 Most civil rights law, of
necessity, contributes to this stigmatization: the group is so vulnerable
that it requires social help.34° The shared picture also demobilizes the
victims of discrimination, particularly the young. Indeed, social scien-
tists have seen evidence of self-hatred and rejection of their own identity
in children of color as early as age three.
3 41
The ubiquity and incessancy of harmful racial depiction are thus the
source of its virulence. 342 Like water dripping on sandstone, it is a perva-
sive harm which only the most hardy can resist. Yet the prevailing first
amendment paradigm predisposes us to treat racist speech as an individ-
ual harm, as though we only had to evaluate the effect of a single drop of
water. This approach-corresponding to liberal, individualistic theories
of self and society-systematically misperceives the experience of racism
for both victim and perpetrator. This mistake is natural, and corre-
sponds to one aspect of our natures--our individualistic selves. In this
capacity, we want and need liberty. But we also exist in a social capacity;
we need others to fulfill ourselves as beings. In this group aspect, we
require inclusion, equality, and equal respect.343 Constitutional narra-
tives of equal protection and prohibition of slavery-narratives that en-
courage us to form and embrace collectivity and equal citizenship for
all-reflect this second aspect of our existence.
When the tacit consent of a group begins to coordinate the exercise
of individual rights so as seriously to jeopardize participation by a
smaller group, the "rights" nature of the first group's actions acquires a
different character and dimension. 344 The exercise of an individual right
338 See Brown, supra note 2 (language constructs harmful pictures of persons of color); Ingersoll,
Race and Ethnic Relations Among High School Youths: Perspectives from Psychology, INT'L J.
GROUP TENSIONS 26 (1988) (language establishes rules and expectation by which child or adolescent
makes sense of world; language of prejudice establishes a "rationality" for it); see also J. GOULD,
THE MISMEASURE OF MAN (1981) (pseudo-science contributed to notion of inferiority of nonwhite
races).
339 See generally I. KA-z, supra note 256 (stigma the product of multiple encounters); Delgado,
supra note 16; Lawrence, supra note 20, at 22 (no racist act or slur is isolated).
340 K. BUMILLER, supra note 337, is the best expression of this view; see also D. BELL, supra note
21, at 2-51 (American race-remedies law itself advances racism).
341 E.g., M. GOODMAN, supra note 258, at 55-56.
342 See supra notes 22-23, 251-72 and accompanying text (racial treatment systematic and in-
creasing); see also Minow, supra note 16 (on power to label others); Peller, The Metaphysics ofAmer-
ican Law, 73 CALIF. L. Rav. 1151, 1274-89 (1985) (on language of social roles).
343 A. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (1982); M. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUS-
TICE (1982); Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Foreword: Traces of Self-Government,
100 HARV. L. Rav. 4 (1985).
344 In general, we need the first amendment to protect minorities from tyranny by the majority.
But with racist insults and epithets, the majority uses speech to construct a stigma-picture of the
384
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now poses a group harm and must be weighed against this qualitatively
different type of threat.
3 45
First amendment scholar Kent Greenawalt's recent book346 has
made a cautious move in this direction. Although generally a defense of
free speech in its individual aspect, his book also notes that speech is a
primary means by which we construct reality.3 47 Thus, a wealthy and
well-regarded citizen who is victimized by a vicious defamation is able to
recover in tort. His social "picture," in which he has a property interest,
has been damaged, and will require laborious reconstruction. It would
require only slight extension of Greenawalt's observation to provide pro-
tection from racial slurs and hate-speech. 348 Indeed, the rich man has
the dominant "story" on his side; repairing the defamation's damage will
be relatively easy.
Racist speech, by contrast, is not so readily repaired-it separates
the victim from the storytellers who alone have credibility. Not only
does racist speech, by placing all the credibility with the dominant group,
strengthen the dominant story, it also works to disempower minority
groups by crippling the effectiveness of their speech in rebuttal.349 This
situation makes free speech a powerful asset to the dominant group, but a
much less helpful one to subordinate groups-a result at odds, certainly,
minority. Arguably, the cautions that ordinarily operate in favor of protecting speech do not apply
here.
Of course, it may be pointed out that some of the framers and theoreticians of the Constitution
and first amendment favored slavery and the oppression of colored peoples. See T. HOBBES, LEVIA-
THAN, pt. II, ch. 221 (Of the Liberty of Subjects); D. BOUMGOLD, HOBBES'POLITICAL THEORY 93-
97 (1988); J. LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, 2d Treatise, §§ 17,24, 85; R. GANT, JOHN
LOCKE'S LIBERALISM 67 (1987). Yet later in our history we committed ourselves-through the
thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth amendments-to an antisubordination principle. See supra notes
6-25 and accompanying text. Generally, empowered persons will favor competition and the market-
place of ideas, while those lacking a strong voice will view the universalizing, quasi-objective values
of the marketplace of ideas with mistrust and will prefer the more contextualized perspectives af-
forded by equal protection analysis. See Delgado, supra note 16. Our dilemma is that we wish to
promote both values at the same time. One cannot, however, "balance" incommensurables; creation
of a new category of speech-act for behavior by which a more powerful group creates a stigma-
picture of a weaker one seems the only solution.
345 See Denvir & Powell, Caliban's Complaint: Racist Speech and the First Amendment (unpub-
lished, on file with author) (Brandeis's more affirmative view of first amendment as protecting dia-
logic function of citizen participation yields support for antiracism rules and statutes).
346 See K. GREENAWALT, supra note 302.
347 Id. at 217-20, 299-302; see also P. BERGER & T. LUCKMAN, supra note 16; M. POLANYI, supra
note 337.
348 This extension would not be the first time the struggle for black justice has yielded doctrinal
benefits for all. See H. KALVEN, THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1965) (pointing out
that reforms born of the cauldron of civil rights often end up benefiting all society, not just blacks).
See also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
349 Recent developments in "norm theory" bear this out. We experience empathy for persons
who suffer misfortune only if we believe that their misfortune is outside the norm for them. If our
experience teaches us that blacks are ordinarily poor or stigmatized, we will experience little empa-
thy for one who is. See Miller & Kahneman, Norm Theory, 93 PSYCH. REV. 136, 136-53 (1986).
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with marketplace theories of the first amendment. Unless society is able
to deal with this incongruity, the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments
and our complex system of civil rights statutes will be of little avail. At
best, they will be able to obtain redress for episodic, blatant acts of indi-
vidual prejudice and bigotry. This redress will do little to address the
source of the problem: the speech that creates the stigma-picture that
makes the acts hurtful in the first place, and that renders almost any
other form of aid-social or legal-useless.
B. Operationalizing the Insight
Could judges and legislators effectuate this Article's suggestion that
speech which constructs a stigma-picture of a subordinate group stands
on a different footing from sporadic speech aimed at persons who are not
disempowered? It might be~argued that all speech constructs the world
to some extent, and that every speech act could prove offensive to some-
one. Traditionalists find modern art troublesome, Republicans detest
left-wing speech, and some men hate speech that constructs a sex-neutral
world. Yet race-like gender and a few other characteristics-is differ-
ent; our entire history and culture bespeak this difference.350 Thus,
judges easily could differentiate speech which subordinates blacks, for
example, from that which disparages factory owners. Will they choose
to do so? There is cause for doubt: low-grade racism benefits the status
quo.35 1 Moreover, our system's winners have a stake in liberal, market-
place interpretations of law and politics-the seeming neutrality and
meritocratic nature of such interpretations reassure the decisionmakers
that their social position is deserved.35 2
Still, resurgent racism on our nation's campuses is rapidly becoming
a national embarrassment. Almost daily, we are faced with headlines
featuring some of the ugliest forms of ethnic conflict and the spectre of
virtually all-white universities. The need to avoid these consequences
may have the beneficial effect of causing courts to reflect on, and tailor,
constitutional doctrine. As Harry Kalven pointed out twenty five years
ago, it would not be the first time that insights born of the cauldron of
racial justice yielded reforms that ultimately redounded to the benefit of
all society. 353
350 Race and sex are more deeply inscribed, culturally and individually, than almost anything
else. One could forget momentarily that one is a law student or labor lawyer. Try to imagine,
however, what it would be like to forget that one is a female or a black.
351 See supra note 319; D. BELL, supra note 21 (putting forth economic determinist theory of civil
rights and racial justice).
352 D. BELL, supra note 21; Delgado, When a Story Is Just a Story: Does Voice Really Matter?, 76
VA. L. REv. 95, 100-03 (1989).
353 H. KALVEN, supra note 348.
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VII. CONCLUSION
This Article began by pointing out a little-noticed indeterminacy in
the way campus antiracism rules are analyzed. Such rules may be seen
either as posing a first amendment problem or falling within the ambit of
the equality-protecting amendments. The survey of the experience of
other nations in regulating hate speech and the writings of social scien-
tists on race and racism do not dispel this indeterminacy. Each view is
plausible; each corresponds to a deeply held narrative; each proceeds
from one's life experiences; each is backed by constitutional case law and
principle. Each lays claim to the higher education imperative that our
campuses reflect a marketplace of ideas.
354
The gap between the two approaches can be addressed by means of a
post-modem insight: racist speech is different because it is the means by
which society constructs a stigma-picture of disfavored groups. It is tac-
itly coordinated by its speakers in a broad design, each act of which
seems harmless, but which, in combination with others, crushes the spir-
its of its victims while creating culture at odds with our national values.
Only by taking account of this group dimension can we capture the full
power of racially scathing speech-and make good on our promises of
equal citizenship to those who have so long been denied its reality.
354 Compare Gunther, No, STANFORD LAWYER, Spring 1990, at 7 (free speech requires that we
tolerate even repulsive messages) with Wiener, supra note 142 (affirmative intervention necessary to
protect campus diversity); see also Gibbs, supra note 2, at 105 (black students dropping out or enroll-
ing at all-black colleges); Wilkerson, Racial Harassment Altering Blacks' Choices on Colleges, N.Y.
Times, May 9, 1990, at 1, col. 5 (same).
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